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BOOK REVIEW 
Deforming Tort Reform 
LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES. By Peter 
W. Huber.t New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1988. Pp. 260. $19.95. 
Reviewed by Joseph A. Page* 
I. THE MANY MEANINGS OF "TORT REFORM" 
The storms buffeting the tort system over the past two decades have come 
in three distinct waves. In the late 1960s, steep increases in the insurance 
costs incurred by health care providers protecting against negligence claims 
by patients triggered what came to be known as the "medical malpractice 
crisis."1 In the mid-1970s, manufacturers whose liability insurance premi-
ums suddenly soared raised obstreperous complaints that called public atten-
tion to the existence of a "product liability crisis."2 Finally, other groups 
whose activities created risks exposing them to lawsuits found that their lia-
t Senior Fellow, Manhattan Institute. 
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. The author wishes to thank his col-
leagues Bill Vukowich and Mike Gottesman, and Victor E. Schwartz, Esq., for their helpful sugges-
tions, and Karin L. Stein, Class of 1990, Georgetown University Law Center, for her diligent 
research assistance. 
Some of the ideas in this essay were first put forward by the author in a debate with Dr. Peter W. 
Huber at the Federalist Society's Annual National Symposium on Law and Public Policy at the 
University of Michigan Law School on March 10, 1989. A transcript of the debate will be pub-
lished in 13 HARV. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y - (forthcoming 1990). 
1. Premiums jumped sharply in 1969 and 1970, stabilized, and then took off again in 1975 and 
1976. See Munch, Causes of the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis: Risks and Regulation, in 
THE EcONOMICS OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 125, 127 (S. Rottenberg ed. 1978). The first increase 
provoked a congressional investigation. For the results of the probe, see STAFF OF SENATE SUB-
COMM. ON EXEC. REORG. OF THE SENATE COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, MEDICAL MALPRAC-
TICE: THE PATIENT VERSUS THE PHYSICIAN, 9lst Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) [hereinafter MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE: THE PATIENT VERSUS THE PHYSICIAN]. The increases also persuaded President 
Richard M. Nixon to direct the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare to create a special 
commission to study the problem in detail. For the commission's report, see U.S. DEP'T OF 
HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S 
COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (1973) [hereinafter MALPRACTICE REPORT]. For a de-
tailed analysis of the second round of increases, see P. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THE-
ORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 97-117 (1985). 
2. For a detailed federal task force study of the problem, see U.S. DEP'T OF CoMMERCE, INTER-
AGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY, FINAL REPORT (1978). 
The first congressional hearings on the subject focused on product liability problems affecting 
small business. See Impact on Product Liability: Hearings Before the Senate Select Comm. on Small 
Business, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), and 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (five vols.); see also Product 
Liability Insurance: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Capital, Investment and Business Opportuni-
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bility insurance rates had also risen precipitously. A full-blown "torts crisis" 
was at hand. 3 
The common law of torts attracted a major share of the blame for each of 
the three "crises." Observers blamed the medical malpractice crisis on judi-
cial decisions that expanded the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur by permitting 
juries to infer negligence from the mere occurrence of an untoward result 
following medical treatment, and that recognized a duty of due care by phy-
sicians to disclose the risk of treatment to patients.4 Members of Congress, 
among others, blamed the product liability crisis on state-by-state variations 
in rules governing the obligations of manufacturers and sellers.5 Working 
groups formed to study the issue found the across-the-board torts crisis at-
tributable to the erosion of fault as the basis for liability and the adoption of 
rules and practices that were allegedly responsible for "undue" increases in 
compensatory as well as punitive damage awards. 6 
As a consequence, those adversely affected by rising insurance costs de-
manded, and often achieved, what they called "tort reform." Responding to 
pressure, states enacted pro-defendant legislative adjustments to common 
law rules of medical malpractice,? products liability, 8 and general tort law.9 
ties of the House Comm. on Small Business, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (five vols.) [hereinafter 
Product Liability Insurance]. 
For the first academic treatment of product liability reform, see Symposium on Products Liability 
Law: The Need for Statutory Reform, 56 N.C.L. REv. 623 (1978). 
3. For reports of an executive branch task force formed to study the problem, see TORT POLICY 
WORKING GROUP: REPORT ON THE CAUSES, EXTENT AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THB CUR· 
RENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY (1986) (hereinafter TORT POL· 
ICY WoRKING GROUP REPORT]; TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP: AN UPDATE ON THB 
LIABILITY CRISIS (1987) [hereinafter TORT POLICY WORK GROUP UPDATE]. 
For representative academic treatments of the torts crisis, see Tort Reform Symposium, 64 DEN. 
U.L. REv. 613 (1988); Symposium.· Issues in Tort Reform, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 317 {1987). 
4. See Morris, "Res Ipsa Loquitur"-Liability Without Fault, 163 J. A.M.A. 1055 (1957), re· 
printed in 25 INs. CouNs. J. 97 {1958); Letter from Richard P. Bergen, Director, Legal Research 
Department, American Medical Association, to Senator Abraham Ribicotf, reprinted in MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE: THE PATIENT VERSUS THE PHYSICIAN, supra note 1, at 505, 509-10. 
5. See S. REP. No. 670, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-10 (1982) (federal product liability legislation 
needed to resolve uncertainties in tort system). 
6. See TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 3, at 30-42; TORT POLICY WORK• 
lNG GROUP UPDATE, supra note 3, at 53-59. 
7. For a discussion of state malpractice statutes, see Note, Legislative Responses to the Medical 
Malpractice Crisis, 39 OHIO ST. L.J. 855 (1978) (by J. Ricci). 
8. For a discussion of state product liability legislation, see Note, Status and Trends in State 
Product Liability Law: Theories of Recovery, 14 J. LEGIS. 216 (1987) (by D. Stuby). 
9. For analyses of state tort reform statutes, see Drier, Analysis: 1987 Product Liability Act, 41 
RUTGERS L. REv. 1279 (1989); Graham, 1987 Oregon Tort Reform Legislation: True Reform or 
Mere Restatement?, 24 WILLAMETTB L. REv. 283 (1988); Hunter, Alabama's 1987 Tort Reform 
Legislation, 18 CUMB. L. REv. 281 (1988); Montford & Barber, 1987 Texas Tort Reform: The Quest 
for a Fairer and More Predictable Texas Civil Justice System, 25 Hous. L. REV. 59 (pt. 1), 245 (pt. 
2) (1988); Terry, Retreat and Reaction: An Analysis of the Tort Reform Act, 56 UMKC L. REV. 205 
(1988); Substantive Analyses of Tort Changes, Jurisdictional Survey of Tort Provisions of Washing-
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By equating tort reform with unidirectional statutory modification of the 
common law, its advocates succeeded in investing the term with a politically 
useful, if skewed, meaning.1o 
Until the dawn of the present age of tort-related "crises," the notion of tort 
reform was likely to evoke images of a movement to change pro-defendant 
common law rules11 so that injured plaintiffs could more easily win judg-
ments or recover full damages.12 Indeed, through the first half of the twenti-
eth century, the tort system tended to protect the interests of defendants in 
general13 as well as particular categories of defendants.14 What might be 
called the "old tort reform" was partly an effort to rectify these imbalances. 
ton's 1986 Tort Reform Act, 22 GONZ. L. REv. 47 (1986-87) (by T. Donaldson, S. Hensen & M. 
Jordan). 
10. Opponents of the new tort reform find themselves in the uncomfortable position of being 
against "reform," a word that conveys a sense of progress, improvement, and the correction of 
abuse or imperfection. Proponents have made full use of the term. For example, an organization 
founded and funded by groups whose economic interests would benefit from pro-defendant tort-rule 
modifications calls itself the American Tort Reform Association (ATRA). On the founding of 
ATRA, see Strasser, New Group Enters Tort-Reform Arena, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 3, 1986, at 3, col. 1. 
11. The extent to which these rules had crystallized in the nineteenth century and the forces that 
motivated them are matters of academic controversy. For the view that nineteenth-century tort law 
promoted the interests of industry, making it difficult for plaintiffs to recover, see L. FRIEDMAN, A 
HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 467-87 (2d ed. 1985); M. HOROWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 67-108 (1973); see also G. WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA 61-62 
(1980) (nineteenth century tort doctrine narrowed compensation). Professor Lawrence M. Fried-
man has noted that tort law in the nineteenth century became a "noncompensation system." Fried-
man, Civil Wrongs: Personal Injury Law in the Late 19th Century, 1987 AM. B. FoUND. REs. J. 
351, 369 (1987). Friedman points out that accident victims were not only prejudiced by tort doc-
trine, but also were confronted with social and legal obstacles that dampened their expectations of 
compensation. /d. at 369-73. 
For a contrary view arguing that nineteenth-century tort law "exhibited a keen concern for vic-
tim welfare," see G. Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century America: A Rein-
terpretation, 90 YALE L.J. 1717, 1720 (1981); see also G. Schwartz, The Character of Early 
American Tort Law, 36 UCLA L. REv. 641, 664-70 (1989) (reinforcing and expanding thesis that 
nineteenth-century tort law promoted compensation). 
12. There are, of course, instances in which pre-crises alterations of tort law benefitted defend-
ants. For example, during the first four decades of this century many states enacted "guest stat-
utes" reducing the duty automobile drivers owed to guest passengers. See W. PROSSER & W. 
KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 34, at 215-17 (5th ed. 1984). Over the past two decades, however, 
many legislatures have repealed or modified their guest statutes and a number of courts have held 
them unconstitutional on equal protection grounds. See id. 
13. Many states at one time maintained statutory limits on the amount of damages that could be 
recovered against a defendant who tortiously caused the death of another, regardless of the actual 
economic loss to the survivors. For a chart listing these states and the caps on their wrongful-death 
statutes in 1935, 1955, and 1965, seeS. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH 490 (1st ed. 
1966). 
Until 1946, courts would not hold a defendant who negligently injured a pregnant woman and 
caused her child to be born with injuries liable for the harm to the child. See W. PROSSER & W. 
KEETON, supra note 12, § 55, at 367. 
14. On the limited duties that possessors of land owe to entrants upon the land, and that land-
lords owe to tenants, see generally J. PAGE, THE LAW OF PREMISES LIABILITY (2d ed. 1988). 
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One common law rule that protected all defendants was the doctrine of 
contributory negligence, which completely barred plaintiffs from recovery 
whenever their negligence helped to cause the injuries they sustained. The 
legislative abolition of this doctrine and the enactment of comparative negli-
gence statutes, which enabled plaintiffs to recover but reduced their recov-
eries in proportion to their degree of fault, exemplify the spirit of the old tort 
reform. 15 
In addition to legislative enactments, the far more usual method for re-
forming tort law in the pre-crises period was through the courts. Appellate 
judges exercising the creative powers at the core of the common law system 
rewrote a good deal of the law of torts. 16 Although the stirrings of the old 
tort reform can be traced through judicial decisions during the first half of 
this century,17 the pace did not quicken until the 1950s and 1960s.18 With an 
extraordinary outburst of energy, the courts recognized their new duties, 19 
abolished immunities,20 and adopted expansive rules for measuring dam-
15. For a discussion of comparative negligence, see generally V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE 
NEGLIGENCE (2d ed. 1986); White, Tort Reform in the Twentieth Century: An Historical Perspec-
tive, 32 VILL. L. REv. 1265, 1284-88 (1987). 
Another example of statutory tort reform is the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), which 
governs suits by railroad employees against their employers. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1988). FELA, 
which was enacted in 1908, abolishes the defense of assumption of risk, adopts comparative negli-
gence, and has been construed as liberalizing the plaintiff's burden to establish causation. See gen-
(~~~~):hillips, An Evaluation of the Fet{.eral Employers' Liability Act, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 49 
16. See Vetri, The Integration of Tort Law Reforms and Liability Insurance Ratemaking in the 
New Age, 66 OR. L. REv. 277, 278-85 (1987) (citing case law that illustrates the dramatic change in 
the common Jaw of tort). 
17. For a notable early example, see MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 390-91, 111 
N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916) (despite lack of privity assembler of product owed duty of reasonable care to 
ultimate consumer); see also President & Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 
827 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (charitable immunity abrogated); Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 141-42 
(D.D.C. 1946) (duty to refrain from negligently inflicting prenatal injuries owed to viable fetus 
subsequently born alive); Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 86-87, 199 P.2d 1, 5 (1948) (burden to 
prove causation shifted to defendants when two defendants negligently discharged firearms and one 
bullet struck plaintift). 
18. For a detailed treatment of the judicial pro-plaintiff tort-reform movement between 1958 and 
1967, seeR. KEETON, VENTURING TO Do JUSTICE: REFORMING PRIVATE LAW 25-77 (1969); see 
also Ursin, Judicial Creativity and Tort Law, 49 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 229, 301 (1981) (modifica-
tions of tort law in 1960s and 1970s, especially in California, considered "exemplary illustration of 
desirable judicial creativity"). 
19. See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 119-20, 443 P.2d 561, 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 
104 (1968) (landowners owed duty of reasonable care to all entrants, regardless of status); Natanson 
v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 411, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106, reh'g denied, 187 Kan. 186, 190, 354 P.2d 670, 
672 (1960) (physician owed duty to inform patient of material risks inherent in treatment or sur-
gery); Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 239-40, 176 N.E.2d 729, 731-32, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34, 35-36 
(1961) (duty to refrain from negligently inflicting mental distress that results in physical harm even 
when no physical impact on plaintiff's body). 
20. See Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130, 133 (Fla. 1957) (municipal corpora-
tion held liable under doctrine of respondeat superior). 
1990] LIABILITY 653 
ages.21 Perhaps the most dramatic development was the judicial adoption of 
a rule of strict tort for harm caused by defective, unreasonably dangerous 
products.22 
Assigning any single cause to this judicial activism would be an oversim-
plification. The courts were responding to arguments that existing rules were 
illogical,23 unfair to plaintiffs,24 or inconsistent with tort law's goals of deter-
rence and compensation.25 Enterprise liability, which posits that a business 
or activity should bear the costs of the harm it causes,26 provided the major 
impetus for the shift from a negligence theory to a strict liability theory in 
products liability.27 
Yet there were other important contributors as well. The work of legal 
scholars provided much of the theoretical framework for the old tort re-
21. See Beaulieu v. Elliott, 434 P.2d 665, 671, 676 (Alaska 1967) (damages for impaired future 
earning capacity not reduced to present value because inflation offsets power of lump sum award to 
earn interest during plaintiff's period of disability); Wycko v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331, 333-35, 105 
N.W.2d 118, 121-22 (1960) (pecuniary value of deceased child's life measured by child's worth as 
part of family, including cost of child's upbringing). 
22. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62, 377 P.2d 897, 900-01, 27 Cal. 
Rptr. 697, 700 (1963) (holding manufacturer of combination power tool strictly liable in tort for 
harm caused by defective product). 
23. Partly because they have recognized the illogic of the argument that personal tort actions 
between husbands and wives would disrupt the harmony of the home, courts have eroded inter-
spousal immunity. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 863-64 (4th ed. 1971). 
24. See Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811, 819 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950) 
(recognizing wife's right to recover for loss of consortium because husband would have same right); 
Maddux v. Donaldson, 362 Mich. 425,428-30, 108 N.W.2d 33, 35-38 (1961) (defendants jointly and 
severally liable when plaintiff injured in chain collision cannot prove by a balance of probabilities 
which defendant caused which portion of multiple injuries; unfair to deny innocent victim recovery 
for damages caused by negligent defendants). 
25. See, e.g., Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11, 24, 163 N.E.2d 
89, 95 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 968 (1960) (abolition of school district's immunity would 
encourage school districts to exercise greater care in selection and supervision of employees); Parker 
v. Port Huron Hosp., 361 Mich. 1, 33, 105 N.W.2d 1, 15 (1960) (maintaining rule of charitable 
immunity would foster neglect, whereas abolishing immunity would induce greater caution); Rap-
paport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 205, 156 A.2d 1, 10 (1959) (imposing liability upon liquor licensees 
for negligently serving alcoholic beverages to minors and intoxicated persons would substantially 
increase diligence of licensees not to serve such persons); DeNike v. Mowery, 69 Wash. 2d 357, 368-
69,418 P.2d 1010, 1017-18, amended by 422 P.2d 328 (1966) Gudgment for plaintiff against original 
tortfeasor for injuries sustained in car accident did not relieve plastic surgeon of liability for subse-
quent negligent treatment of those injuries). 
26. The rationale for this theory of strict liability is that enterprises control risks and therefore 
are in a superior position to minimize them. Additionally, they have a superior capacity to spread 
and bear the costs of these risks. On enterprise liability, see generally Klemme, The Enterprise 
Liability Theory of Torts, 47 U. CoLO. L. REv. 153 (1976). For an analysis of difficulties that are 
likely to arise in translating the theory into practice, see generally Henderson, The Boundary 
Problems of Enterprise Liability, 41 Mo. L. REv. 659 (1982). 
27. See generally Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellec-
tual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985) (arguing that enterprise 
liability theory has shaped the contours of contemporary product liability law). 
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form.28 These scholars created the intellectual climate for what occurred in 
the 1950s and 1960s29 and gave courts rationales for rejecting pro-defendant 
rules and doctrines. The growth of a bar association of trial attorneys repre-
senting injured plaintiffs in the years following World War 1130 resulted not 
only in aggressive front-line pressure for the judicial adoption of doctrines 
that favored plaintiffs,31 but also in the development of tactical skills enabling 
plaintiffs to win substantial jury verdicts. 32 
As history suggests, the old tort reform constituted but one swing of a 
pendulum that later began to reverse itself in the wake of the crises of the 
1970s and 1980s. Thus, construed most favorably, the "new tort reform" has 
become an effort to eliminate alleged excesses perpetrated by the old tort 
reform and to restore equilibrium to the system. 
Despite their apparent similarities, there is an important difference be-
tween the old and the new tort reform. The former derived inspiration and 
major impetus from the ideas of scholars33 and had its primary influence on 
the courts. The latter is fueled by the economic self-interest of those who 
perceive themselves as adversely affected by the tort system. In essence, the 
28. For a representative sampling, see Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20 
MICH. L. REv. 497 (1922) (arguing that emotional distress deserves greater legal protection); 
Green, Landowner v. Intruder; Intruder v. Landowner. Basis of Responsibility in Tort, 21 MICH. L. 
REv. 495 (1923) (criticizing limitations on landowner's duty to trespassing children); Gregory, Loss 
Distribution by Comparative Negligence, 21 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1936) (criticizing contributory negli-
gence); James, Accident Liability: Some Wartime Developments, 55 YALE L.J. 365 (1946) (criticiz-
ing governmental and charitable immunities); Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability 
to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960) (advocating a rule of strict tort liability in products 
cases). 
There were, of course, occasional professorial voices raised against rules favoring plaintiffs. See 
Henderson, Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat from the Rule of Law, 51 IND. L.J. 467 
(1976) (criticizing developments of tort system that focus upon substantive objectives without fac-
toring in realities and limitations of adjudication); Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injury: The Impact 
of Insurance, 18 L. & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 219 (1953) (arguing against awarding damages for pain 
and suffering). 
29. See generally G. WHITE, supra note 11. 
30. The National Association of Claimants' Compensation Attorneys (NACCA), founded in 
1946, was originally an organization of attorneys who represented injured workers. It subsequently 
broadened its membership to include all tort lawyers who represented injured plaintiffs. The group 
has changed its name several times. In 1960, it became the National Association of Claimants' 
Counsel of America; in 1964, the American Trial Lawyers Association (ATLA); and in 1972, the 
Association of Trial Lawyers of America (ATLA). On the Association's history, see Jameson, 
ATLA, TRIAL, July 1980, at 56. 
31. See Green, The Thrust of Tort Law, Part L· The Influence of Environment, 64 W. VA. L. REV. 
1, 19 (1961). Professor Green comments: "The balance of power between the respective advocates 
[in personal-injury litigation] has been more nearly restored, and the doctrines so excessively 
overweighted in defendant's favor during the 1800's in most instances are being more fairly stated 
and employed." Id. 
32. On the educational mission of the plaintiffs' bar, see Lambert, NACCA-Rumor and Reflec-
tion, 18 NACCA L.J. 25, 30-31 (1956); Jameson, supra note 30, at 60-62. 
33. See supra note 28. 
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new tort reform is a political attack on tort law in the legislative arena. 34 
This has important implications. Politicians tend by nature to be much 
more pragmatic than theoretical. To convince them of the real need for leg-
islation, contemporary tort reformers stress the most dramatic argument for 
their case-skyrocketing liability insurance rates. Yet there is no guarantee 
that making tort rules more favorable to defendants will decrease premi-
ums. 35 Moreover, the political process inevitably involves the sort of com-
promise that can blunt the efforts of the new tort reformers36 and open the 
door to legislative counterattacks. 37 
34. Some scholars have testified in favor of aspects of the new tort reform before legislative com-
mittees. See Product Liability: Legislative Hearings, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Consumer 
Protection and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 90, 351 (1980) (testimony of Professors James A. Henderson, Jr., representing the National 
Product Liability Council, and Richard A. Epstein, representing the American Insurance Associa-
tion). However, the contributions of academics to new tort reform have been supportive rather 
than seminal. See Twerski, The Joint Tortfeasor Legislative Revolt: A Rational Response to the 
Critics, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1125, 1125 (1989) ("The legislative reform movement has been 
successful beyond the hopes of its most ardent advocates. Academia was caught napping."). 
35. For arguments that factors other than tort suits triggered the malpractice crisis, see generally 
J. GUINTHER, THE MALPRACTITIONER (1978); S. LAW & S. POLAN, PAIN AND PROFIT: THE 
PoLmcs OF MALPRACTICE (1978); see alsoP. DANZON, supra note 1, at 225 (arguing that the 
malpractice crisis of 1975 was caused by rising costs of claims that resulted in part from increased 
health care use of the late 1960s and in part by a shift to pro-plaintiff tort doctrines); Henriques, 
Just What the Doctors Ordered: The Crisis in Medical Malpractice is Ending, BARRON's, Oct. 2, 
1989, at 8 (positing that malpractice suits have contributed to improvements in the quality of health 
care, thereby easing the malpractice crisis). 
For arguments that the product liability insurance crisis was unrelated to changes in tort rules 
governing product liability suits, see Page & Stephens, The Product Liability Insurance "Crisis:" 
Causes, Nostrums and Cures, 13 CAP. U.L. REv. 387, 399-404 (1984) (arguing that increase in 
insurance premiums was not caused by substantive law of products liability, but rather by factors 
internal to the insurance industry). But see Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modem Tort 
Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1526-32 (1987) (explaining and criticizing collusion theories, insurance 
cycle theories, and Justice Department's tort law theory as an explanation of drastic changes in 
insurance industry). 
For a thoughtful analysis of the insurance aspects of the torts crisis, see Abraham, Making Sense 
of the Liability Insurance Crisis, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 399 (1987). For a good description of the cyclical 
nature of the commercial property and casualty insurance businesses, see Crenshaw,For Insurers, a 
'Slippery Slide' Into a Slump, Wash. Post, June 11, 1989, at Hl, col. 1. The author writes: "A 
number of factors explain the vulnerability of insurance to these powerful cycles, among them a 
herd instinct that governs pricing policy, intense pressure on companies to maintain market share, 
and the fluctuations of interest rates." Id. at H5, col. 1. 
36. See Pierce, Institutional Aspects of Tort Reform, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 917, 919-22 (1985) (argu-
ing that legislatures are incapable of resolving controversial issues because they are paralyzed by an 
agenda filled with complicated issues, lack of expertise to resolve difficult questions, and an inability 
to foresee problems caused by a new legal regime). 
37. See H.R. 129, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (bill making information secured by discovery in 
product liability suits available to other claimants or government in certain instances; would nullify 
effects of protective orders obtained by defendants to prevent disclosure of information adversely 
affecting them in litigation involving other injured claimants); S. 2497, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) 
(bill imposing upon companies who issue commercial property or casualty insurance policies report-
ing requirements about premiums collected, claims paid, and legal and administrative costs); see 
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Consumer advocates and the plaintiffs' trial bar have been vigorously re· 
sisting the political thrust of the new tort reform. They argue that the sharp 
increases in liability insurance premiums that created the crisis atmosphere 
resulted from economic factors having nothing to do with the tort system,38 
and that reducing the potential liability of the providers of goods and services 
will also diminish safety incentives that the tort system creates. 39 
Although the expression "tort reform" characterizes changes in rules gov· 
erning liability or damages, it also applies to efforts to develop alternative 
mechanisms for compensation and deterrence.40 In this sense, tort reform 
has a history that dates to the beginning of this century. The legal barriers 
confronting suits on behalf of workers killed in job· related accidents derived 
not only from tort rules that provided employers with a formidable set of 
defenses tilted in their favor, 41 but also from the nature of the tort system. 
The legal process made it virtually impossible for people with limited finan· 
cial resources to vindicate their common law rights with any realistic hope of 
success, and failed to address the more general problem of how society 
should deal with the inevitable toll of industrial accidents and illnesses.42 
Political reformers43 provided the impetus for state workers' compensation 
statutes that abolished common law defenses and the need to prove the em· 
also Vandall, Undermining Torts' Policies: Products Liability Legislation, 30 AM. U.L. REV. 673, 
694-95 {1981) (summary of state insurer reporting requirements). 
38. See Availability and Affordability Problems in Liability Insurance: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1985) 
(testimony of J. Robert Hunter, President of the National Insurance Consumer Organization) (ar-
guing that premiums reflect cyclical pattern of insurance industry); Habush, The Insurance "Cri-
sis": Reality or Myth? A Plaintiffs' Lawyer's Perspective, 64 DEN. U.L. REv. 641, 646-48 (1988) 
(skyrocketing rates caused by insurance industry's pricing practices). 
39. See Adding Insult to Injury: The Drive to Change the Product Liability Laws, CoNSUMER 
REP., July 1978, at 412; Lambert, Suing for Safety, TRIAL, Nov. 1983, at 48, 56. 
40. For a sinillar categorization of approaches to tort reform, see Stewart, Crisis in Tort Law? 
The Institutional Perspective, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 184 (1987). Professor Stewart's analysis centers 
upon current reactions to the crises. He finds three discrete classes of definitions, diagnoses, and 
cures: (1) those that derive from the belief that the problem is in fact an "insurance crisis," to be 
solved by reforms in the insurance industry; (2) those that assign blame to tort law and seek pro-
defendant modifications in tort doctrine and practices; and (3) those that find fault with the tort 
system as a whole and advocate alternative institutions to perform all or many of the functions of 
tort law. Id. at 190-95. 
41. See C. EASTMAN, WORK-ACCIDENTS AND THE LAW 169-89 {1910); 1 A. LARSON, THE 
LAW OF WORKMEN'S CoMPENSATION § 4.30, at 25-28 (1985); W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra 
note 12, § 80, at 568-72. 
42. See J. PAGE & M. O'BRIEN, BITTER WAGES 51-53 (1972). Even after the enactment of 
worker's compensation statutes, the tort system continued to evidence an incapacity to deal equita-
bly with work-related disabilities not covered by the new laws. For a dramatic example of how 
inadequacies in the law and disparities in the economic and social positions of employees and their 
employers produced a major injustice, see J. PAGE & M. O'BRIEN, supra, at 63-67 {describing tort 
litigation arising from contraction of silicosis by nearly 2,000 workers digging a tunnel near the 
Gauley Bridge, West Virginia in 1930 and 1931). 
43. See Rabin, Some Reflections on the Process of Tort Reform, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 13, 17-19 
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player's negligence, limited the compensation to work-connected accidents, 
and set up administrative boards to resolve claims expeditiously.44 
Another alternative method of compensation arose after the evolution of 
the automobile as the primary method of transportation. 45 This emphasis on 
automobiles converted accidents into major societal problems. Critics of the 
tort system's approach to automobile accident cases sought alternative mech-
anisms that would guarantee swift and certain benefits to the victims of high-
way mishaps.46 They eventually succeeded by gaining legislative approval in 
some states for no-fault auto accident compensation plans.47 
The various crises of the past two decades have provoked relatively little in 
the way of alternative compensatory mechanisms. To date, the most notable 
federal initiative has been the National Childhpod Vaccine Injury Act,48 
which created an optional system of no-fault compensation for vaccine-re-
lated adverse reactions.49 Perhaps the most interesting experiment in radical 
change at the state level is Virginia's Birth-Related Neurological Injury 
Compensation Act. 50 This Act created a no-fault compensation fund for in-
(1988) (describing worker's compensation legislation as part of a broader pattern oflegislative activ-
ity during the Progressive Era). 
44. For a brief description of the birth of worker compensation, see J. PAGE & M. O'BRIEN, 
supra note 42, at 47-55; W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 12, § 80, at 572-73; see also G. 
WHITE, supra note 11, at 1268-77; see generally A. LARSON, supra note 41. For an analysis of 
shortcomings in the workers' compensation system, seeN. AsHFORD, CRISIS IN THE WORKPLACE: 
OcCUPATIONAL INJURY AND DISEASE ch. 8 (1976); see also Phillips, In Defense of the Tort System, 
27 ARIZ. L. REv. 603, 604-06 (1985) (arguing that low wage loss compensation and minimal deter-
rent effects make system ineffective). 
45. See J. KEATS, THE INSOLENT CHARIOTS (1958) (satirical account of the American preoccu-
pation and obsession with the automobile). 
46. For various criticisms of the treatment of traffic accidents under the common law, see R. 
KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE 'fRAme VICTIM: A BLUEPRINT FOR 
REFORMING AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 34-69 (1965). 
47. For a brief history of no-fault automobile accident reparations statutes, see W. PROSSER & 
W. KEETON, supra note 12, § 84, at 606-08. 
48. Pub. L. No. 99-660, tit. III, 100 Stat. 3755 (1986) (codified in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C.); see infra note 90 (discussing Act's imposition of strict liability on manufacturer of defective 
vaccine). The closest approximation to radical change in the general area of products liability came 
in a bill that was reported out of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 
in 1986. The bill sought to use measures such as caps on damages for pain and suffering as incen-
tives to expedite the settlement of product liability claims. See S. REP. No. 422, 99th Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1986). After a heated floor debate, the bill was withdrawn from the Senate's agenda. See 
N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1986, at Al7, col. 1; 132 CoNG. REc. S13,709 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1986). 
49. See Dark, Is the National Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 the Solution for the DTP Controversy?, 
19 U. TOL. L. REv. 799, 840 (1988) (describing legislative history and arguing that the Act is a 
good solution); V. Schwartz & L. Mahshigian, National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986: An 
Ad Hoc Remedy or a Window for the Future?, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 387, 393-97 (1987) (explaining that 
dual compensation system/tort reform approach in the Act was in response to a unique situation 
and would not work in broad liability bill); see also Huber, Will New Vaccine Statute Give Shot in 
Arm to Tort Reform?, Legal Times, Mar. 9, 1987, at 9, col. 1, at 10, col. 1 (discussing history of 
vaccine and praising statute as moving in right direction). 
50. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-5000 to -5021 (Supp. 1987). 
658 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 78:649 
fants with a defined class of severe birth-related injuries. 5 1 
One particular category of suit is provoking insistent calls for radical re-
form. A relatively recent phenomenon, the mass tort, is placing enormous 
strains on the tort system. The mass tort is a byproduct of the use of modern 
technological products that have the capacity to inflict serious harm upon 
large numbers of people-harm which may manifest itself gradually over an 
extended period of time. Mass tort litigation has wrestled, and continues to 
wrestle, with perplexing problems of causal relations, defining compensable 
injury, and identifying the responsible source.52 Some critics have been in-
spired to suggest alternative approaches both to compensating victims and 
deterring those responsible for creating widespread exposures to insidious 
hazards. 53 
Meanwhile, some academic commentators have responded to concerns 
that run deeper than insurance-related crises. They offer not only systemic 
criticisms of what they perceive to be tort law's failure to fulfill its functions 
in a cost-effective way, but also proposals for structural change or alternative 
institutions that would greatly reduce or even abolish the role of the tort 
system in deterring accidents and compensating accident victims. 54 
51. See Note, Innovative No-Fault Tort Reform for an Endangered Specialty, 14 VA. L. REV. 
1487, 1502-04 (1988) (by P. White) (supporting statute as a partial solution to overburdened mal-
practice liability system). But see Couric, Jury Still Out on Novel Tort Law, Nat'l L.J., July 3, 1989, 
at 3, col. 1 (after almost 18 months, no claims filed under Virginia's Birth-Related Neurological 
Injury Compensation Act because definition of infants so narrow that few met standard). 
52. See Rabin, Tort Law in Transition, 23 VAL. U.L. REv. 1, 15-24 (1988) (heightened sensitivity 
to unseen dangers heralded mass tort era, leaving judiciary struggling to formulate doctrinal re-
sponse that properly compensates victims); see generally Rubin, Mass Torts and Litigation Disasters, 
20 GA. L. REv. 429, 445-46 (1986) (suggesting that mass tort litigation makes our two-party adver-
sary system obsolete and should be replaced by uniform federal tort law enabling filing of mass tort 
suits in one forum); Weinstein, Preliminary Reflections on the Law's Reaction to Disasters, 11 
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 43-44 (1986) (suggesting that when dealing with mass tort disaster, na-
tional system of health and disability insurance is necessary for compensating victims and minimiz-
ing costs); Wiliiams, Mass Tort Class Actions: Going, Going, Gone?, 98 F.R.D. 323, 325-29 (1986) 
(suggesting that class actions are best device to accommodate problems of mass tort suits). 
53. See, e.g., P. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MAss TOXIC DISASTERS IN THE COURTS 
(1986) (case study of litigation by Vietnam veterans against companies that manufactured Agent 
Orange, an herbicide linked to cancer, birth defects, and other health problems). For an argument 
that the Agent Orange litigation demonstrates the value of the tort system, see Marcus, Apocalypse 
Now? (Book Review), 85 MICH. L. REv. 1267 (1987) (reviewing P. ScHUCK, supra). 
54. See O'Connell, A "Neo No-Fault" Contract in Lieu of Tort: Preaccident Guarantees of Post-
accident Settlement Offers, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 898 (1985) (proposing replacement of current fault-
based system with compensation scheme that functions through pre-accident no-fault agreements); 
Pierce, Encouraging Safety: The Limits of Tort Law and Government Regu/atio11, 33 V AND. L. 
REv. 1281, 1320-21 (1980) (proposing creation of federal agency to replace tort law); A. Schwartz, 
Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 91 YALE L.J. 353, 392-413 (1988) 
(proposing strict liability with contributory negligence for products liability); Sugarman, Doi11g 
Away with Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 555, 642-64 (1985) (proposing replacement of tort law with 
income-protection mechanisms, regulatory strategies, and citizen involvement); see ge11era/ly Abel, 
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II. HUBER'S CONTRIBUTION 
This is the setting into which Peter W. Huber has injected Liability: The 
Legal Revolution and Its Consequences. 55 His book sets out to convince the 
general reader that tort law has become mired in a "poisonous swamp,"56 
explain how it arrived there, and suggest ways to salvage it. Huber, who 
holds both a doctorate in mechanical engineering and a law degree, 57 is a 
senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute, a "think tank" devoted to free mar-
ket oriented policy research. 58 
Although Huber has previously authored thoughtful critiques of public 
risk regulation through administrative action 59 and private tort suits, 60 Lia-
bility makes no pretense at being scholarly. 61 Indeed, the many inaccuracies 
and distortions sprinkled throughout the book lend it a certain perverse 
charm. The book targets the lay reader and sets out to savage the current 
tort system in no uncertain terms. With a voice that ranges from brisk to 
acerbic to mean-spirited, 62 Huber is of a mind to take no prisoners as he 
heaps scorn upon the "naive" academics and judges whom he accuses of 
creating the intellectual framework of contemporary tort law63 and upon the 
trial lawyers who have translated theory into practice. 64 
Within the context of the current debates over tort reform, Liability serves 
Torts, in THE PoLmCS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRmQUE 185 (D. Kairys ed. 1982) (critically 
analyzing the relation of tort law to capitalism and arguing for change to socialism). 
55. P. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988). 
56. Id. at 18. 
57. He entered the Massachusetts Institute of Technology at age 17, and eight years later became 
the school's youngest professor of mechanical engineering. See Warsh, No-Fault: We Hardly Knew 
You, Boston Globe, Oct. 2, 1988, at AI, col. 1. He received a J.D. from Harvard University in 
1982. 
58. See Moore, Legal Right Thinkers, NAT'L J., Oct. 1, 1988, at 2455-56 (discussing conservative 
"think tank" activities); see also Brimelow, Thunder on the Right, FORBES, Feb. 8, 1988, at 148 
(profile of William M.H. Hammett, President of the Manhattan Institute). The Manhattan Insti-
tute supported the publication of Huber's book. See P. HUBER, supra note 55, at x. 
59. Huber, Electricity and the Environment: In Search of Regulatory Authority, 100 HARV. L. 
REv. 1002 (1987) (critical appraisal of regulation of electric power, arguing that one purpose of 
regulation is to deter harm to public health and the environment); Huber, The Old-New Division in 
Risk Regulation, 69 VA. L. REv. 1025 (1983) [hereinafter Risk Regulation] (calling for greater 
clarification and systematic implementation of the distinction between old predictable risks and new 
unforeseen risks). 
60. Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 
85 COLUM. L. REv. 277 (1985) (criticizing legal system's willingness to accept private risk over 
public risk). 
61. Although the book contains endnotes, many factual assertions are not supported and must be 
accepted on faith alone. 
62. His use of an ethnic slur is particularly offensive. See P. HUBER, supra note 55, at 152. 
63. Id. at 17. 
64. In a sentence dripping with the legal profession's equivalent of class bias, he avers (without 
citing any authority) that "[t]he lawyers who started careers as small-town traffic accident litigators 
were later to take on automakers, municipalities, taverns, and distilleries." Id. at 9. 
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the immediate political interests of those who favor pro-defendant changes in 
the law of torts. 65 The book passes harsh, though not always original, judg-
ments upon the old tort reform, which Huber refers to as the "great revolu-
tion,"66 and upon the current tort system in general. His criticisms lend 
support to efforts to bring about changes in pro-plaintiff doctrines and 
procedures. 
Yet the book advocates much more than tinkering with the common law. 
Huber believes that the great revolution has brought no less than cata-
strophic consequences to those it was meant to benefit. 67 His prescription is 
not only the doctrinal rollback urged by the new tort reformers but also a 
return to contract as the primary mechanism by which individuals adjust 
their rights and responsibilities. 
The high praise the book has garnered in some quarters68 and Huber's 
Aprominence as an outspoken critic of the torts process69 make Liability an 
appropriate subject for extended commentary. In a highly readable format, 
Huber has compressed virtually every negative assessment that has ever been 
rendered against modem tort law in an effort to persuade the public of the 
need for drastic change. The validity of some of these animadversions, how-
ever, does not necessarily require throwing out the baby with the bathwater. 
This review takes issue with Liability's version of the great revolution and 
its aftereffects. The book offers solutions that seem to aim at restoring imbal-
65. For excerpts from the book used in an advertisement by an insurance company attacking the 
tort system, see The Liability Lottery: We All Lose (advertisement), Wash. Post, Apr. 20, 1989, at 
A14-15, June 15, 1989, at A22-23. 
66. P. HUBER, supra note 55, at ix. 
67. He fulminates that "open-ended tort law serves only as an engine of social destruction." /d. 
at 221. Not to be outdone in matters rhetorical, economist George Gilder calls the "ever-spreading 
crisis of liability and legal overreach ... the cancer of capitalism." /d. jacket cover. 
68. The Wall Street Journal has been especially enthusiastic. See Kozinski, Torts Are No Piece of 
Cake, Wall St. J., Oct. 6, 1988, at A16, col. 5; see also Barrett, Courts May Have to Lead Product-
Liability Reform, Wall St. J., Oct. 7, 1988, at Bl, col. 4 (summarizing some of book's recommenda-
tions); Huber, Insurance, Not Lawsuits, for the Accident Prone, Wall St. J., Sept. 28, 1988, at A24, 
col. 5 (condensing some of book's arguments). For a lengthy encomium of the book in another 
business-oriented publication, see Bailey, Legal Mayhem, FORBES, Nov. 14, 1988, at 97, col. 1. 
Tort law luminaries Richard Epstein, Jeffrey O'Connell, and George Priest offer high praise on 
the book jacket. See P. HUBER, supra note 54, jacket cover. 
69. Huber speaks frequently on the shortcomings of the liability system. See, e.g., Bus. INS., 
Nov. 14, 1988, at 75 (report of Huber's briefing to Chicago area business leaders); Bus. WIRE, Nov. 
30, 1988 (wire service report of Huber speech to executives of Royal Insurance); Executive Speaker, 
July 1, 1988, at 9 (NEXIS, BWIRE file) (report of Huber's speech at Shavano Institute seminar). 
Huber has been widely quoted by others. See, e.g., Friendly, Fear of Living, THE NEW REPUB-
LIC, Jan. 23, 1989, at 14, 16; Brookes, The High Costs of Nader-Tort, Wash. Times, May 10, 1989, at 
F1, col. 1; Passell, Making a Risky Life Bearable: Better Data, Clearer Choices, N.Y. Times, May 9, 
1989, at A1, col. 1, at Cl3, col. 1; Gladwell, AIDS Vaccine Dilemma: Who Pays If There Are 
Lawsuits?, Wash. Post, Nov. 25, 1988, at C10, col. 2. 
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ances. Its solutions, however, will merely force another swing of the pendu-
lum and produce yet another movement for reform. 
III. THE REACH OF ENTERPRISE LIABILITY 
The great revolution that incites Huber's wrath exploded in the 1960s 
when a shadowy group of academics and judges he christens the "Foun-
ders"70 began to convince courts to abandon traditional rules of tort and 
· contract law. According to Huber, they urged the creation of a broad regime 
of liability that ignored notions of both personal responsibility, the core of · 
negligence (;octrine, and free choice, as expressed by agreements ·between 
purchasers and providers of goods and services.71 Reducing legal history to 
caricature, Huber claims that the cabal broadened over the next two decades 
as a group of legal economists joined forces with the Founders to justify the 
new tort theory as necessary to remedy market failures. 72 The Founders and 
70. The only "Founders" he identifies by name are the late William L. Prosser, John W. Wade, 
and the late Roger J. Traynor. P. HUBER, supra note 55, at 6. 
William Prosser was for many years the Dean of the University of California School of Law at 
Berkeley and a professor at the Hastings College of the Law. He was also Reporter for the Second 
Edition of the Restatement of Torts and the author of the authoritative HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF 
ToRTS (5th ed. 1984). He wrote influential law review articles that predicted and then celebrated 
judicial adoption of strict liability for defective products. See generally Prosser, The Assault upon 
the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960); Prosser, The Fall of the 
Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REv. 791 (1966). For an analysis of Pros-
ser's influence on the development of tort law, see G. WHITE, supra note 11, at 139-79. 
John Wade, Dean Emeritus of the Vanderbilt University School of Law and a curious choice as a 
"Founder," succeeded Prosser as Reporter for the Restatement of Torts. He presumably owes his 
nomination as a "revolutionary" to a much-cited article in which he developed a seven factor test 
for determining whether a product is unreasonably dangerous and hence subject to strict liability. 
See Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 837-38 (1973). For 
Wade's own modest assessment of his contributions and those of Traynor and Prosser, see Wade, 
An Evaluation of the ''Insurance Crisis" And Existing Tort Law, 24 Hous. L. REv. 81, 83 (1987) 
(referring to Traynor and Prosser as "generals" and himself as a "PFC," or private first class). 
Roger Traynor, for three decades a distinguished justice of the Supreme Court of California, 
wrote a concurring opinion urging the adoption of a rule of absolute liability for defective products. 
See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461-63, 150 P.2d 436, 440-42 (1944) (Tray-
nor, J., concurring). He also authored the opinion for a unanimous court that adopted a rule of 
strict liability for defective products. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62, 
377 P.2d 897, 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1962) (en bane). For an analysis of Traynor's influence 
on tort theory, see G. WHITE, supra note 11, at 180-210. 
Even though Huber concedes that his nominations were selective rather than inclusive, it is sur-
prising that he omits Fleming James, Jr., from his "Hall of Shame." For an analysis of James' 
profound impact on the evolution of tort theory, see Priest, supra note 27, at 465-83. 
71. See P. HUBER, supra note 55, at 6-7. 
72. /d. at 6. Huber pours considerable scorn upon law and economics scholarship generally, and 
upon its "dense prose, arcane jargon, and elaborate methodology" in particular. Id. (lronically, 
throughout the book he draws heavily upon the writings of George L. Priest, a professor of law and 
economics at Yale Law School.) The only individuals he actually fingers are Dean Guido Calabresi 
of the Yale Law School and Judge Richard Posner of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit and formerly a professor at the University of Chicago Law School. In his relentless 
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their allies sought to force on those who furnish goods and services the cost 
of all accidents associated with what they sell or do. They argued that cost 
internalization would help achieve the twin goals of accident deterrence and 
victim compensation.73 The result would be a regime of enterprise liability. 
While conceding that their intentions may have been noble, Huber argues 
that the Founders inflicted upon society disastrous short-term repercussions. 
These include the dramatic increases in the costs of goods and services and 
the decline in their availability, which he dubs the "tort tax."74 Moreover, 
the new rules discourage scientific and technological innovation 75 that in the 
long run would produce a net social gain. 76 The new rules either overlook or 
fail to take sufficient account of safety trade-offs. As a result, liability im-
posed on one type of conduct has encouraged alternative conduct that is even 
riskier or more detrimental to the public welfare. 77 
If Huber's agenda had been more modest and had confined itself to the 
field of products liability, characterizing the developments of the 1960s and 
1970s as a great revolution would be defensible. But he is clearly on the 
spoor of bigger game. Although most of his examples relate to the strict 
liability rules governing the duties of manufacturers and suppliers of goods, 
he insists that he is writing about the tort system, an assertion fortified by 
occasional references to liability problems faced by the suppliers of services 
and others.78 Thus, to those unfamiliar with tort law, Huber creates the im-
pression that strict tort liability, which he also refers to as "ultra-stringent 
producer liability"79 and "no-fault,"80 applies to all tort cases.st 
pursuit of oversimplification, he lumps the work of all "legal economists" together despite signifi-
cant differences among them. For a concise analysis of some of these differences, see G. WHtTE, 
supra note 11, at 219-24 (Posner argues negligence theory is more compatible with the efficient use 
of society's resources than strict liability because it creates incentives for all to improve safety, while 
Calabresi argues that strict liability achieves a higher degree of efficiency because it is based on 
injury rather than the arbitrariness of fault). C/. Donohue, The Law and Economics of Tort Law: 
The Profound Revolution (Book Review), 102 HARV. L. REv. 1047, 1051 (1989) (reviewing W. 
LANDES & R. POSNER, THE EcONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987) and S. SHAVELL, ECO· 
NOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW (1987)) (criticizing Huber's criticisms of Calabresi and 
Posner). 
73. P. HUBER, supra note 55, at 7. 
74. Id. at 4, 11. The tort tax represents the increase in the price of goods and services, which 
reflects the risk of liability associated with each good or service. I d. at 4. 
75. See infra PART IV. 
76. P. HuBER, supra note 55, at 14-15 (arguing that because the new tort rules place technology 
in the "liability dock," older, proven technologies are less subject to liability). For an earlier article 
in which Huber blames both the tort system and government regulators for stifling innovation, see 
Huber, Who Will Protect Us From Our Protectors?, FORBES, July 13, 1987, at 56. 
77. See infra notes 166-94 and accompanying text. 
78. See P. HUBER, supra note 55, at 55 (building owner liable to burglar who fell through sky-
light), 68-69 (companies liable for use and dumping of toxic chemicals), 77 (psychologist liable for 
failing to warn murder victim of psychotic patient's intent to kill her), 163 (physician liable for 
treating accident victim who is stranger). 
79. Id. at 27. 
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The perception that the revolution in tort law has created a regime of strict 
liability owes its existence to those, like Huber, who link the recent expansion 
of tort liability (here called the old tort reform) to judicial acceptance of the 
theory of enterprise liability.82 They are thus able to assign the theory credit 
(or blame) not only for the actual shift to strict tort as a basis for holding 
, manufacturers and sellers liable for defects in their products, but also for the 
adoption of other common law rules favoring plaintiff recoveries against 
business enterprises. 83 
The difficulty with this expansive interpretation of the role of enterprise 
liability lies in the paucity'of evidence to support the view that the courts 
carrying out the old tort reform had as their primary motivation an urge to 
impose enterprise liability. When one ventures beyond the spacious confines 
of the products liability field, the number of decisions employing enterprise 
liability even as part of their ratio decidendi is sparse indeed. 84 Thus, from 
80. /d. at 132. 
81. One example of the sleight of hand that Huber practices in intertwining strict liability and 
negligence occurs in a section entitled "The Climate for Change." Id. at 25. He first describes the 
inception of strict liability for breach of the implied warranty of fitness in cases involving the human 
consumption of food and drugs during the first decades of the twentieth century. Id. He then 
describes the consumer movement of the 1950s and 1960s, and the "unprecedented intellectual 
assault" by the Founders (presumably resulting in the adoption of strict liability for all defective 
products). /d. at 26. He makes passing reference to a patient's right to sue a doctor in malpractice 
actions, which require proof of negligence. I d. He then returns to discussing the Founders and 
summarizes their theory of basing liability not upon fault, but upon the identification of the party 
best able to prevent an accident at the cheapest cost. Id. at 27. Finally he points to hospitals, city 
governments, and universities as exemplary cheaper-cost avoiders, a reference that strongly suggests 
they would be subject to the new strict tort liability when in fact they are not. /d. 
82. The theory of enterprise liability postulates that providers of goods and services should bear 
the losses associated with their goods and services without regard to negligence. Professor Priest is 
perhaps the foremost advocate of the proposition that strict liability owes its existence to the judicial 
acceptance of enterprise liability theory. See Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort 
Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1534-36 (1987); see also Ursin, supra note 18, at 299-303 (espousing 
theories of enterprise liability). 
83. The rule of strict liability for abnormally dangerous activity is a form of enterprise liability 
that requires those engaged in highly risky operations to bear losses occasioned by the ultra-
hazardous aspects of their enterprises. See Siegler v. Kuhlman, 81 Wash. 2d 448, 459-60, 502 P.2d 
1181, 1187 (1972) (en bane) (defendant strictly liable for death caused by explosion resulting from 
spill of gasoline on road), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 983 (1973); see generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS §§ 519, 520 (1977) [hereinafter REsTATEMENT]. The rule first appeared in the nine-
teenth-century decision ofRylands v. Fletcher, 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330,340 (1868) (defendant held 
liable without fault wheri water from defendant's land filled plaintiff's mines). Thus, it hardly mer-
its inclusion in the old tort reform. For arguments that the rule should be interpreted more broadly 
to extend the reach of enterprise liability, see Nolan & Ursin, The Revitalization of Hazardous 
Activity Strict Liability, 65 N.C.L. REv. 257, 286-93, 310-14 (1987). 
84. Virtually all the cases cited in Priest, supra note 82, involved products liability. One of the 
decisions, Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968) (en bane), 
cited in Priest, supra note 82, at 1536, did not impose liability upon a business enterprise but rather 
upon a private individual who was a social host. Priest, supra note 82, at 1536 n.81. The court's 
rationale was not enterprise liability but n!!gligence. In listing factors that judges should consider in 
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the perspective of tort law in general and with the exception of products 
liability, the theory of enterprise liability is more a gleam in the eyes of schol-
ars than a reflection of actual case law. 
One important reason for this is the difficulty courts encountered in estab-
lishing standards for imposing liability. To postulate that producers of goods 
and services should bear losses occasioned by those goods and services is not 
enough; the court must further specify which losses, or what kinds of goods 
and services, will trigger a finding of liability. 8s 
Contrary to Huber's assertions, the so-called great revolution produced by 
the theoretical work of Huber's Founders has imposed enterprise liability 
only to the extent that courts have adopted a rule of strict tort liability for 
the sale of defective and unreasonably dangerous goods. 86 Although the 
cases occasionally suggest that this strict products liability might appropri-
ately extend to cover classes of defendants other than manufacturers and 
retailers, 87 this simply has not occurred. The courts' failure to agree upon 
determining whether a duty of reasonable care exists, the court mentioned the prevalence and avail-
ability of insurance that the defendants might have purchased. Rowland, 69 Cal. 2d at 113, 443 
P.2d at 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 100. However, there is nothing in the opinion to suggest that this was 
the critical factor. 
Likewise, virtually every decision cited in Ursin, supra note 18, falls vlithin the area of products 
liability. One exception, Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel, 3 Cal. 3d 756, 478 P.2d 465, 91 Cal. Rptr. 745 
(1970), cited in Ursin, supra note 18, at 302 n.470, shifted the burden to defendant of proving that 
the absence of a statutorily required lifeguard at a motel swimniing pool did not cause plaintiff's 
drowning. 3 Cal. 3d at 772, 478 P.2d at 475, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 755. The court reasoned that to 
maintain the traditional rule and require the plaintiff to prove that the deaths would not have 
occurred in the presence of a lifeguard would be tantamount to negating the duty imposed by the 
statute. Id. at 772-75,478 P.2d at 475-77, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 755-57. Only in a footnote did the court 
add that its holding was consistent with "the emerging tort policy of assigning liability to a party 
who is in the best position to distribute losses over a group which should reasonably bear them." 
I d. at 775 n.20, 478 P.2d at 477 n.20, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 757 n.20. Thus, the notion of enterprise 
liability plays only a minor supporting role in Haft. 
85. If the only test were whether the harm could be attributed to a good or a service (causal 
relation), serious difficulties would result in cases in which multiple causative factors contributed to 
the plaintiff's injuries. See G. Schwartz, Foreword: Understanding Products Liability, 61 CALIF. L. 
REv. 435, 445-47 (1979) (in multiple causation accidents, uncertainty about which enterprise is 
actually liable requires courts either to charge the party most at fault, or charge the parties propor-
tionately to their fault); see generally Henderson, supra note 26, at 662-76 (assessing problem of 
determining which enterprises and which injuries should give rise to liability). 
86. That courts have agreed upon a liability trigger in products cases does not mean that the 
"defective-and-unreasonably-dangerous" test has not created difficulties. See Page, Generic Product 
Risks: The Case Against Comment k and/or Strict Tort Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 853, 860-64 
(1983) {discussing difficulties drafters of Restatement (Second) of Torts had in defining "defective" 
and "unreasonably dangerous"); see generally J. BEASLEY, PRODUCI'S LIABILITY AND THE UN· 
REASONABLY DANGEROUS REQUIREMENT (1981) (surveying all U.S. jurisdictions and relying on 
unreasonably dangerous standard to distinguish between strict liability and negligence). 
87. See Clark v. Gibbons, 66 Cal. 2d 399, 414-21, 426 P.2d 525, 535-40, 58 Cal. Rptr. 125, 135-
40 (1967) (Tobriner, J., concurring) (urging rule of strict tort liability for "rare and inexplicable" 
mishaps that occur during surgery); Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d 514, 520-22, 519 P.2d 981, 984-
85 (1974) (Utter, J., concurring) (urging strict tort liability for failure to administer simple 
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the circumstances that should trigger enterprise liability has deterred its 
more expansive use. 
Moreover, even in products liability, the predominance of strict liability is 
not nearly as absolute as Huber would have us believe. In cases of mis-
manufacture, when a product departs from its own specifications as set by 
the manufacturer, 88 the theory applies clearly and cleanly: a plaintiff must 
prove merely the existence of the defect and the resulting harm. 89 Proof of 
negligence or fault is not required. Nevertheless, no undue burdens appear 
to have been placed upon producers, who can generally predict with some 
degree of accuracy the rate of defects associated with varying levels of quality 
control.90 Initiatives for products liability reform at the federal level have 
not sought to rescind the rule of strict liability for manufacturing defects.91 
glaucoma test when it can be "defined with sufficient precision"); cf. ~ote, Continuing the Common 
Law Response to the New Industrial State: The Extension of Enterprise Liability to Consumer Serv-
ices, 22 UCLA L. REv. 401 passim (1974) (by J. Chait) (arguing for extension of enterprise liability 
to services). 
The California Supreme Court, analogizing to products liability decisions, has imposed a rule of 
strict liability upon residential landlords for harm caused by defects that existed at the time the 
premises were leased. Becker v. IRM Corp., 38 Cal. 3d 454, 458-67, 698 P.2d 116, 118-24, 213 Cal. 
Rptr. 213, 215-21 (1985) (en bane) (alternative holding). For a sympathetic commentary on the 
decision, see Nolan & Ursin, Strict Tort Liability of Landlords: Becker v. IRM Corp. in Context, 23 
SAN DIEGO L. REv. 125 (1986) (arguing that strict liability for landlords was foreshadowed and is 
part of natural progression away from fault liability). No other jurisdictions have followed Califor-
nia's lead. 
88. SeeR. EPSTEIN, MODERN PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 68 (1980); 1M. MADDEN, PROD-
UCTS LIABILITY § 9.6, at 330-34 (2d ed. 1988). 
89. See REsTATEMENT, supra note 83, § 402A. But see Priest, Products Liability Law and the 
Accident Rate, in LIABILITY: PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY 84, 208-09 (R. Litan & C. Winston ed. 
1988) (arguing against strict liability for manufacturing defects when manufacturers have taken all 
necessary steps to prevent deviations). 
90. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACT, reprinted in 
44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (Oct. 31, 1979) (analyzing§ 104 of the Model Act, concerning construction 
defects). The report states: "There is a degree of predictability with regard to these defective prod-
ucts that is not found with respect to products that are defective in design or to [sic] failure to 
warn." Id., reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,722. 
91. SeeS. 44, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5(a), 129 CONG. REc. 586-92 (1983) (proposing strict liabil-
ity in construction and manufacture for unreasonably dangerous products); H.R. 1115, ·lOOth 
Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 204(a)(2)(A)(i)-(ii), 133 CoNG. REc. H708 (daily ed. Feb. 18, 1987) (1987) 
(same). 
The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 does not seem to modify the rule of strict 
liability when a vaccine contains a manufacturing defect. The law states that a vaccine manufac-
turer will not be liable for unavoidable side effects from a properly prepared vaccine. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 300aa-22(b)(l) (1988). The implication is that a manufacturer would be liable for harm caused by 
a vaccine that was defective due to improper preparation. The law also provides that, except as 
provided in the Act, state law will govern suits seeking recovery for vaccine-related injuries. Id. 
§ 300aa-22(a). State law provides that drug manufacturers will be strictly liable in tort for harm 
resulting from drugs that depart from the maker's design or formulation. See 2 M. MADDEN, supra 
note 88, § 23.3, at 353-56 (reviewing liability for defective drugs); see also Merrill, Compensation for 
Prescription Drug Injuries, 59 VA. L. REv. 1, 32-35 (1973) (describing leading cases that apply strict 
liability to production defects in drugs). 
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When the injured party claims that the design of a product or the inade-
quacy of warnings or instructions resulted in harm, the implications of strict 
liability are less clear. In these cases involving warnings or instructions for 
use, the courts have generally made little secret that they are applying a neg-
ligence test.92 While paying lip service to the applicability of strict liability in 
design cases,93 many courts require plaintiffs to prove what amounts to a 
negligence case.94 They do this either by adopting a risk-utility test or by 
92. See Hauenstein v. Loctite Corp., 347 N.W.2d 272, 274 (Minn. 1984) (essentially no difference 
between strict liability and negligence if claim is based on failure to warn); see also W. PROSSER & 
W. KEETON, supra note 12, § 99, at 697 (claimant who seeks recovery for failure to warn or failure 
to warn adequately must prove that manufacturer-designer was negligent). Contra Beshada v. 
Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 204-05, 447 A.2d 539, 546-49 (1982) (manufacturer 
strictly liable in tort for failing to warn of risk that was unknowable at time product was marketed). 
93. Indeed, as a strategic matter, plaintiffs' attorneys generally prefer to establish culpability by 
the manufacturer. See Rheingold, The Expanding Liability of the Product Supplier: A Primer, 2 
HoFSTRA L. REv. 521, 531-32 (1974) (easier to prevail when plaintiff can show manufacturer did 
something wrong than when trying to convince jury of technical defect). 
94. See Troja v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 62 Md. App. 101, 488 A.2d 516 (1985). In Troja, the 
court adopted a seven-factor test to determine whether a product is "reasonably safe" for purposes 
of strict liability. I d. at 108, 488 A.2d at 519. The test, which Dean John Wade originally devised 
in his article On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, supra note 70, at 837-38, provides 
that the jury should consider: 
I d. 
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product-its utility to the user and to the public 
as a whole; 
(2) The safety aspects of the product-the likelihood that it will cause injury, and the 
probable seriousness of the injury; 
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the same need and not be as 
unsafe; 
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product without 
impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its utility; 
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of the product; 
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and their 
avoidability, because of general public knowledge of the obvious condition of the product, 
or of the existence of suitable warnings or instructions; 
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss by setting the 
price of the product or carrying liability insurance. 
The traditional negligence formula requires a balancing of the costs of avoiding harm (which 
might include prevention costs and the lost utility of any foreclosed activity) against the foreseeable 
accident costs (the extent of likely harm discounted by the probability of its occurrence). See 
United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (stating negligence formula in algebraic 
terms so that if the possibility of harm is P, the gravity of resulting injury is L, and the burden of 
taking precautions is B, liability depends on whether B is less than P times L); see also W. PROSSER 
& W. KEETON, supra note 12, § 31, at 169-73 (discussing degree of care required by risk-utility 
analysis); Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32-33 (1972) (supporting Judge 
Learned Hand's opinion in Carroll Towing as a way to bring about "efficient" rules of safety). 
The Wade test elaborates considerations that are relevant to the traditional negligence formula. 
See Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict Lia-
bility to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REv. 593, 618-22 (1980) (examining use of Wade's "reasonably 
prudent manufacturer test" and concluding it is "substantially coordinate with liability on negli-
gence principles"); Powers, The Persistence of Fault in Products Liability, 61 TEX. L. REV. 777, 
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using a consumer-expectations test.95 
Huber makes much of the shift from negligence to strict liability in design 
cases,96 and of the shift in focus from the manufacturer's conduct to the 
783-94 (1983) (arguing that the only differences between negligence and strict liability are the role 
of foreseeability and the latter's focus on product rather than manufacturer). 
The author of a recent treatise on products liability has noted: "Read together, the decisional law 
interpreting the manufacturer's design obligation in both negligence and strict liability reflects im-
position of a standard of reasonable care ..•. " 1 M. MADDEN, supra note 88, § 8.1, at 291-92 
(citations omitted). 
For a decision holding that liability for design defects must be based upon negligence, see Prentis 
v. Yale Mfg. Co., 421 Mich. 670, 688-91, 365 N.W.2d 176, 184-86 (1984); cf. Brown v. Superior 
Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1069, 751 P.2d 470, 481-82, 245 Cal. Rptr. 412, 424 (1988) (manufacturers 
of prescription drugs that are allegedly defective in design will be liable only under a negligence 
test); Note, Products Liability- Negligence Presumed: An Evolution, 61 TEX. L. REv. 851 passim 
(1989) (by D. Griffith) (arguing that courts in products liability cases have actually been applying 
rebuttable presumption of negligence). 
95. The consumer-expectation test in effect posits that consumers expect manufacturers to exer-
cise reasonable care. See Leichtamer v. American Motors Co., 67 Ohio St. 2d 456, 467, 424 N.E.2d 
568, 576 (1981) (strict liability instruction appropriate when "plaintiff demonstrates that the prod-
uct failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or 
reasonably foreseeable manner''). 
96. P. HUBER, supra note 55, at 38. Huber illustrates this shift by reference to Evans v. General 
Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1966), and Larsen v. General 
Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968). In the text, Huber leaves the impression that these 
were strict liability cases. Only after tracking down the endnote to Larsen does the reader discover 
that Larsen was a negligence case and that on retrial, plaintiff lost. P. HUBER, supra note 55, at 235 
(notes to p.38). This must surely have puzzled those readers who took with them the impression 
that plaintiffs are supposed to win "ultra-stringent producer liability" cases. Id. at 79. 
With respect to Evans, Huber also claims that "in 1966 the courts were not yet ready to examine 
product design and declare it defective." Id. at 38. The fact is that long before Evans the courts had 
been recognizing a duty on the part of the manufacturers of consumer goods to design their prod-
ucts with reasonable care. See Noel, Manufacturers' Negligence of Design or Directions for Use of a 
Product, 71 YALE L.J. 816, 820-29 (1962) (discussing types of design defects including concealed 
dangers, failure to provide safety devices, and defective material composition); Noel, Recent Trends 
in Manufacturers' Negligence as to Design, Instructions or Warnings, 19 S.L.J. 43 passim (1965) 
(examining cases and articles discussing manufacturer's duty). The court in Evans was not asked to 
impose strict liability for defective design. 
The real significance of Evans and Larsen is that in the former the court refused to impose a duty 
upon an automobile manufacturer to use reasonable care to protect occupants from a "second colli-
sion" (impacts with the interior of the vehicle), but in the latter the court recognized the duty to. 
design a crashworthy car. See Comment, Automobile Design Liability: Larsen v. General Motors 
and Its Aftermath, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 299, 301-12 (1969) (praising Larsen court's refusal to adopt 
Evans' holding that manufacturers need not make crashproof cars). 
Huber states that "[t]he crashworthiness theory of auto maker liability ... did not exist anywhere 
in the nation until a decision by a federal court of appeals in 1968." P. HUBER, supra note 55, at 
129. But the theory dates back at least to 1956. See Katz, Liability of Automobile Manufacturers 
for Unsafe Design of Passenger Cars, 69 HARV. L. REv. 863, 868-69 (1956) (noting need for internal 
safety devices to prevent "second accidents" that are actual cause of injury). For pre-1968 
crashworthiness cases, see Ford Motor Co. v. Zahn, 265 F.2d 729, 732-33 (8th Cir. 1959) (finding 
duty to design to avoid injury from foreseeable quick braking); Mortensen v. Southern Pac. Co., 245 
Cal. App. 2d 241, 245, 53 Cal. Rptr. 851, 854 (1966) (holding foreseeability of automobile crash 
made lack of seatbelt a negligent breach under Federal Employer's Liability Act). Huber's pro-
668 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 78:649 
product's condition.97 But he does not explain how one can prove a product 
is unreasonably dangerous without proving that the manufacturer acted un-
reasonably in putting the product on the market.98 Granted, pockets of gen-
uine strict liability can be found in decisions holding a manufacturer liable 
for failing to warn of an unknowable risk,99 and in two jurisdictions that ease 
traditional requirements of negligence by shifting the burden to the manufac-
turer to prove that a product's design, warnings, or instructions are reason-
ably safe. 100 These approaches to strict liability have bestirred negative 
reactions from various commentators101 and remain very much experimental 
probings rather than widely accepted principles.1oz 
nouncement creates the misimpression that the court in Larsen pulled the crashworthiness theory 
out of thin air. 
97. Courts have often defined the difference between negligence and strict liability in these terms. 
See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 418, 573 P.2d 443, 447, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 229 (1978) 
(in products liability action, trier of fact must focus on product and not on manufacturer's conduct). 
98. One academic commentator has called the distinction "nothing more than semantic artifice." 
Birnbaum, supra note 94, at 648 (arguing test is reasonable care in design choices); see also Powers, 
supra note 94, at 791 ("The analytical distinction between evaluating a product and evaluating a 
manufacturer's conduct is itself tenuous."). 
99. See Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 202, 447 A.2d 539, 545 (1982) 
(court imputes knowledge of risk in strict liability, failure-to-warn case, but negligence requires 
knowledge to be proved). 
100. See Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 885-86 (Alaska 1979) {after plaintiff 
showed injury was proximately caused by design, burden of proof shifted to defendant); Barker, 20 
Cal. 3d at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237 (same). 
101. For a criticism of Beshada, see Page, supra note 86, at 877-82 (criticizing justifications of 
Beshada holding); Wade, On the Effict in Product Liability of Knowledge Unavailable Prior to Mar-
keting, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 734, 751-61 (1983) (arguing that because feasibility and unforeseeable 
uses are assessed at time of product's distribution, hindsight should not be used for unknowable 
dangers); Comment, Requiring Omniscience: The Duty to Warn of Scientifically Undiscoverable 
Product Defects, Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 71 GEO. L.J. 1635, 1646-53 (1983) {by 
W.R. Murray, Jr.) (arguing hindsight approach fails to meet goals of strict liability). 
For criticism of Barker, seeR. EPSTEIN, supra note 88, at 80-85 (criticizing abrogation of con-
sumer expectations test, emphasis on hindsight, shift of burden, and "uncritical" use of cost-benefit 
analysis); Henderson, Renewed Judicial Controversy over Defective Product Design: Toward the Pres-
ervation of an Emerging Consensus, 63 MINN. L. REv. 773, 782-97 (1979) (arguing presumption 
will wreak havoc by allowing plaintiffs with meritless cases to make prima facie cases and impose 
difficult burden of rebuttal on defendant). 
Huber registers his disapproval of Barker with bite and originality: "Reversing a tradition as old 
as the common law itself, the California court baldly announced that if there is no persuasive case 
either way when the design of a product is attacked as defective, the plaintiff wins." P. HUBER, 
supra note 54, at 106-07. 
102. The New Jersey Supreme Court has limited its holding in Beshada to asbestos cases and has 
refused to apply it to the pharmaceutical industry. See Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 
429, 455, 479 A.2d 374, 388 (1984). Moreover, even the significance of Beshada in asbestos cases 
may be minimal. In Beshada, the court accepted as true, for the purpose of ruling upon plaintiff's 
motion to strike the defense of unknowability, defendant's allegation that the dangers of asbestos 
were both unknown and unknowable at the time of the marketing of the product that harmed 
plaintiff. Beshada, 90 N.J. at 197, 447 A.2d at 543. In suits litigated in other jurisdictions, plaintiffs 
had introduced evidence that asbestos suppliers not only knew of the risks but also struggled to keep 
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Although Huber attributes the great revolution to judicial adoption of a 
broad regime of enterprise liability, he does not ignore other aspects of the 
pro-plaintiff tort reform that began in the late 1950s and carried over into the 
1970s. He casts a disapproving eye at developments such as comparative 
negligence, 103 joint and several liability, 104 the discovery rule postponing the 
statute of limitations in some cases, 105 and the recognition of liability for 
them unpublicized. For an account of the litigation against the asbestos industry, seeP. BRODEUR, 
OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE AsBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL (1985). 
103. P. HUBER, supra note 55, at 78. Huber's treatment of contributory negligence in the prod-
ucts liability context distorts beyond recognition the actual application of the rule. He claims that 
because the manufacturer's negligence was irrelevant under the new regime of strict liability, the 
need for "symmetry" made the negligence of the consumer or user sinlilarly irrelevant, and there-
fore "the once broad defense of 'contributory negligence' was abandoned too." I d. at 40; see id. at 
39-40 (citing Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968), as an example of a case 
in which the issue was not the negligence of corporate employees in designing a product, but rather 
the defectiveness of an inanimate product). For a discussion pointing out that Larsen was a negli-
gence case, see supra note 96. 
Huber's assertion is highly misleading at best. A plaintiff's knowing, voluntary, and unreasona-
ble exposure to risks created by a product defect-a particular form of contributory fault-was 
from the very beginning recognized as a defense to strict tort liability. See RESTATEMENT, supra 
note 83, § 402A comment n; 2 M. MADDEN, supra note 88, § 13.7, at 12. Moreover, although 
plaintiff's fault today is not a complete bar to recovery, a number of courts have applied the defense 
of comparative negligence to strict liability products cases and have held that plaintiff's fault may 
be a very relevant limitation on recovery. See Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 736-
37, 575 P.2d 1162, 1168-69, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 386-87 (1978) (driver's alleged intoxication and 
failure to use safety devices cannot be considered complete bar to recovery, but may be evidence of 
contributory fault and reduce plaintiff's recovery proportionately); V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 15, at 
195-99 (discussing products liability revolution and development of comparative fault in strict lia-
bility actions). 
104. P. HUBER, supra note 55, at 79-80. Huber neglects to inform his readers that it was the 
doctrine of comparative negligence, of which he disapproves, that provided the theoretical basis for 
the attack upon the rule of joint and several liability. For an explanation of how the legislative 
adoption of comparative negligence in the State of Washington paved the way for a substantial 
statutory alteration of the rule of joint and several liability, see Peck, Washington's Partial Rejection 
and Modification of the Common Law Rule of Joint and Several Liability, 62 WASH. L. REv. 233, 
237-39 (1987). 
105. P. HUBER, supra note 55, at 89-93. Courts created the discovery rule by interpreting stat-
utes of limitations to start running when plaintiff discovered or should have discovered the injury 
and the causal relationship between the harm and defendant's conduct or product. See 2 M. MAD-
DEN, supra note 88, § 18.6, at 196-98; W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 12, § 30, at 166-67. 
Huber's penchant for misleading overstatement billows forth when he tries to demonstrate the 
unfairness of the discovery rule: ' 
You are the defendant. To win in the pretrial maneuvering on timeliness, you must 
demonstrate that [plaintiff's] injury and its link to your conduct were obvious and plainly 
discoverable years ago. To win in the trial proper, you must demonstrate that no such 
injury or linkage ever existed or could possibly be claimed even today .... [T]he plaintiff, 
must first baldly insist that the injury was subtle, hidden, and quite undiscoverable, and 
then swear high and low that the injury was clear, definite, and quite obviously caused by 
your misconduct. Lawyers love this kind of game, because in the fullness of time they 
always will be paid generously to play both sides. 
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negligently inflicting emotional distress. 106 Huber is also critical of new ap· 
proaches that have led to increased recoveries for pain and suffering107 and 
higher awards of punitive damages. 108 He seems undisturbed that some of 
these changes predated the great revolution109 and were motivated by consid-
erations other than loss distribution. 110 
P. HUBER, supra note 55, at 92. 
He does not explain why defendants should be allowed to make arguments on causation that are 
plainly inconsistent. Moreover, the arguments he puts forward for the plaintiff are not inconsistent 
at all; the existence of an injury and its cause might have been undiscoverable by plaintiff for a 
period of time, but once plaintiff realized what had happened and why, defendant's culpability 
might well have become "clear'' and "definite." 
106. P. HUBER, supra note 55, at 124-27. In his discussion of the development of the common 
law in this area, Huber makes the egregious misstatement that the tavern keeper's wife in I. deS. v. 
W. deS., Y.B. 22 Edw. 3, fo. 99, pl. 60 (1348), recovered no damages against the patron who swung 
a hatchet at her because "the rowdy customer successfully cast doubt on her claim of great emo· 
tional trauma." P. HUBER, supra note 55, at 116. As nearly every first-year law student knows, the 
wife did in fact recover damages:-a result documented in most torts casebooks. See D. DOBBS, 
TORTS AND COMPENSATION: PERSONAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL REsPONSIBILITY FOR IN· 
JURY 494 (1985); R. EPSTEIN, C. GREGORY & H. KALVEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 
1010 (4th ed. 1984); J. HENDERSON & R. PEARSON, THE TORTS PROCESS 961 n.1 (3d ed. 1988); P. 
KEETON, R. KEETON, L. SARGENTICH & H. STEINER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORT AND 
ACCIDENT LAW 81 (2d. ed. 1989); R. POSNER, TORT LAW: CASES AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 13 
(1982); W. PROSSER, J. WADE & V. SCHWARTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 34 (8th ed. 
1988). 
107. P. HUBER, supra note 55, at 121-22. In his discussion of damages for pain and suffering, 
Huber puts forward yet another misstatement of the law: "A trick of the trade known as the golden 
rule or job offer is highly effective. Jurors are urged to consider how much they would demand in 
exchange for having to suffer plaintiff's pain, either gratuitously or as part of a job that required 
them to endure it." Id. at 121 (emphasis omitted). In fact, no jurisdiction has ever endorsed the use 
of the golden-rule argument. Most courts have held it to be improper per se, although some courts 
have held that an assessment of such an argument's prejudicial impact must be made on a case-by-
case basis. See 1 M. MINZER, J. NATES, C. KIMBALL, D. AxELROD & R. GOLDSTEIN, DAMAGES 
IN TORT ACTIONS§ 4.72(1), at 4-294 (1989). 
108. P. HUBER, supra note 55, at 115-16, 119-20, 127-32. Huber's lack of concern for factual 
accuracy carries over to his discussion of punitive damages in which he includes in a paragraph 
listing substantial jury verdicts for exemplary damages singer Connie Francis' recovery of $1.5 
million from the motel where she was sexually assaulted. I d. at 129. The jury actually gave her $2.5 
million in compensatory damages and made no award of punitive damages. See Garzilli v. Howard 
Johnson's Motor Lodges, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 1210, 1213 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (verdict of $2.5 million 
held not excessive as matter of law; evidence supported finding of a minimum of $2,585,000 for loss 
of earnings alone, plus substantial damages for pain, suffering, and psychological problems related 
to the sexual assault). 
109. For example, the doctrine of joint and several liability is deeply rooted in the common law. 
See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 12, §§ 46-47, at 322-30. The trend toward increased 
protection for emotional well-being began long before the "great revolution." See id. § 54, at 359-
67. 
110. The development of trial techniques that brought to the attention of jurors the full dimen-
sions of plaintiffs' harm, including pain and suffering, dates back to the 1940s. At that time, Melvin 
M. Belli began to make creative use of demonstrative evidence and other methods to dramatize the 
extent of his clients' injuries and secure what Belli termed an "adequate award" of money damages. 
See Belli, The Adequate Award, 39 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 37 (1951) (criticizing low verdicts in personal 
injury cases for not adequately compensating a person denied the right "to live out his life free from 
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Huber is particularly critical of the judicial imposition of duties upon par-
ties not directly and immediately linked to injured plaintiffs-a phenomenon 
he dubs the "socialized defense" or "group guilt."111 He recalls with evident 
nostalgia the bedrock notions of proximate cause and privity of contract112 
from a time when the "old tort law" knew exactly where to draw limits of 
liability. But this meant that injuries went uncompensated when a judgment-
proof defendant stood on the near side of the line while the "deep-pocket" 
defendant stood on the far side. The "solution," which the courts adopted 
and Huber decries, was to redraw the line. The New Jersey Supreme Court 
led the way by tossing the privity of contract defense into the dustbin of 
history. The court permitted a plaintiff with no direct contractual link. to a 
manufacturer to recover for breach of an implied warranty of 
merchantability.113 According to Huber, this step emboldened the Founders 
to "trace out causal chains much further than was then permitted by tradi-
tionally crabbed rules of proximate cause."114 They accomplished this by 
using the infinitely malleable concept of reasonable foreseeability. 115 
To one who rejects Huber's flights of fancy involving Founders in a con-
spiracy to make a revolution, a cause-and-effect relationship between the col-
lapse of the privity barrier and the expanded notions of foreseeability and 
pain and suffering, with his mind and body intact"); see generally M. BELLI, READY FOR THE 
PLAINTIFF (1956). For an early biography of Belli, see R. WALLACE, LIFE AND LIMB (1955). 
It is ironic that Belli represented the plaintiff in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 
150 P.2d 436 (1944) (en bane), in which Justice Roger Traynor authored a concurring opinion that 
relied upon enterprise-liability concepts and helped set the stage for the eventual adoption of strict 
tort liability for defective products. See supra note 70. The lasting significance of Escola seems to 
have escaped Belli; for him, the import of the decision lay in the majority opinion's adoption of the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to prove negligence in exploding-bottle cases. See M. BELLI, supra, at 
28. 
111. P. HUBER, supra note 55, at 73-83. 
112. See id. at 71-72. Huber astonishingly misstates the holding in Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R., 
248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928), by claiming: "Perhaps the [railroad] guards had been negligent, 
Justice Benjamin Cardozo ruled. But their error was just too remote from Palsgraf's injury for her 
suit to survive." Id. at 72 (emphasis in original). Cardozo actually emphasized that "[t]he law of 
causation, remote or proximate, is ... foreign to the case before us." Palsgraf, 248 N.Y. at 346, 162 
N.E. at 101. Cardozo noted that the guard had not been negligent toward Palsgraf because he 
could not have reasonably foreseen a risk to her when he pushed onto the train a man with a 
package that turned out to contain fireworks. Id. at 344-45, 162 N.E. at 100-01. 
113. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358,413, 161 A.2d 69, 99-100 (1960) (auto-
mobile steering failure caused car to crash into wall). Because the plaintiff in Henningsen had a 
good cause of action for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability against the retailer who 
sold him the car, the successful assault upon the citadel of privity in Henningsen would have loss 
distribution implications only in cases in which the retailer was not amenable to suit or could not 
satisfy an adverse judgment. 
114. P. HuBER, supra note 55, at 74. 
115. "The legal academics who put forward the new foreseeability test were proud of their idea 
and announced it with pomp, as if exulting in the powers of an extraordinary new telescope. Noth-
ing grew the least bit more precise. But more people could now be sued more often, and that, of 
course, was the whole idea." Id. 
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duty is not immediately apparent. The former reflected the strong influence 
of the theory of enterprise liability;116 the latter merely extended the reach of 
negligence doctrine to new classes of defendants117 and new categories of 
risk. us 
Huber heaps particular sarcasm upon the way courts have used reasonable 
foreseeability-in his view, a meaningless verbal formulation scholars and 
judges invoke as they carry out their not-so-hidden agenda of enlarging the 
ambit of liability.tt9 According to Huber, courts have used the expanded 
concepts of duty and reasonable foreseeability as a means of rounding up 
guests for a "tort law charity barbecue."120 He is particularly critical that 
courts have imposed on defendants duties to protect certain classes of plain-
tiffs from the criminal acts of third parties. He cites as examples the liability 
imposed on the manufacturer of a "Saturday Night Special" handgun that a 
criminal used in an armed robbery, 121 on landlords and occupiers of business 
116. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
117. See, e.g., Hanberry v. Hearst Corp., 276 Cal. App. 2d 680, 81 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1969) (prod-
uct endorser owes purchasers duty to use due care in selecting products for endorsement); Rap-
paport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 202, 156 A.2d 1, 9 (1959) (dramshop owner may be liable under 
ordinary negligence principles for harm caused by minor to whom defendant had served liquor and 
who thereafter drove his automobile into vehicle operated by decedent); Erickson v. Christenson, 99 
Or. App. 104, 781 P.2d 383 (1989) (church might be liable for negligent supervision of pastor who 
seduced parishioner if it knew or should have known that pastor was inadequately trained as coun-
selor and had taken advantage of parishioners and counseled persons). 
118. See, e.g., Weirum v. RKO Gen., Inc., 15 Cal. 3d 40, 47, 539 P.2d 36, 40, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468, 
492 (1975) (radio station sponsoring contest that urged teenage drivers to speed from one location 
to another may be held liable for creating foreseeable risks of injury to others using highways); Ricci 
v. American Airlines, 226 N.J. Super. 377, 544 A.2d 428 (1988) (carrier should have foreseen 
"flareup" between intransigent smoker and militant nonsmoker forced to sit in smoking section 
because of overbooking; carrier might be liable for failing to use due care to prevent fight which 
resulted in injury to smoker); Strunk v. Zoltanski, 62 N.Y.2d 572, 468 N.E.2d 13 (1984) (landlord 
who knew prior to leasing that tenant intended to keep dangerous dog on premises had duty to use 
due care to protect third persons from risk of injury from dog). 
119. "In the end, the difference between the foreseeable and the unforeseeable in the courts 
turned out to be very much like the difference (as defined by legendary National League umpire Bill 
Klem) between a ball and a strike. There wasn't any until the umpire had called it." P. HUBER, 
supra note 55, at 77. 
120. /d. at 70. 
121. Id. at 75. The case to which he refers is Kelley v. R.G. Indus., 304 Md. 124, 157, 497 A.2d 
1143, 1159 (1985); see infra note 198. What he fails to tell his readers is that every other court faced 
with the identical issue has refused to hold the manufacturer liable. See, e.g., Armijo v. Ex Cam, 
Inc., 843 F.2d 406, 407 (lOth Cir. 1988) {applying New Mexico law, court held manufacturer not 
liable for death or personal injury from criminal use of "Saturday Night Special" handgun); Ship-
man v. Jennings Firearms, Inc., 791 F.2d 1532, 1534 (11th Cir. 1986) (applying Florida law, court 
held manufacturer not liable for death from criminal use of "Saturday Night Special" handgun 
when gun had no design defects and performed exactly as intended); Richardson v. Holland, 741 
S.W.2d 751, 755-56 (Mo. App. 1987) (manufacturer not liable for injuries from criminal use of 
"Saturday Night Special" handgun); Knott v. Liberty Jewelry & Loan, Inc., 50 Wash. App. 267, 
275-76, 748 P.2d 661, 665 (1988) (manufacturer not liable for injuries from criminal use of handgun 
when "Saturday Night Special" was not shown to be defective); cf. Martin v. Harrington & Rich-
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premises for failing to protect tenants or customers fr.om intruders' criminal 
attacks, 122 on tavern owners for serving drinks to minors or obviously intoxi-
cated persons whose subsequent drunk driving injures plaintiffs, 123 and on 
psychotherapists for failing to warn third persons whom their patients 
threatened and then harmed.124 But Huber greatly oversimplifies both the 
function served by foreseeability and the difficulties courts have had in apply-
ing the foreseeability factor to cases involving harm caused by third party 
criminals. 
Foreseeability of harm is a starting point for the creation of legal duties, 
whereby courts determine whether to impose certain broad obligations upon 
society as a whole or upon specified groups within society. At this prelimi-
nary stage, however, foreseeability comes into play only in a very general 
ardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200, 1204 (7th Cir. 1984) (applying Illinois law, court held manufacturer 
not liable for death from criminal use of handgun when gun was nondefective an9 presented danger 
that average consumer would recognize). 
122. P. HUBER, supra note 55, at 76; see J. PAGE, supra note 14, § 11, at 291-314 (discussing the 
liability of landlords and occupiers for harm caused by criminal acts of third persons). 
Huber also mentions, with apparent distaste, what he calls the "novel theory of negligent hiring," 
under which an occupier of business premises or a landlord might be liable to an employee or a 
tenant who was the victim of a criminal assault at the hands of a person engaged to work on the 
premises, if a reasonable background check would have revealed that hiring the individual might 
create an unreasonable risk of harm. P. HUBER, supra note 55, at 76 (emphasis omitted). The case 
to which he alludes is Ponticas v. K.M.S. Invs., 331 N.W.2d 907, 914 (Minn. 1983), in which the 
court upheld a jury verdict finding the owner of an apartment complex liable for failing to perform a 
reasonable investigation which would have revealed that the man being hired to manage the com-
plex had a history of committing violent crimes over the prior four years. Huber states that the 
manager raped one of defendant's tenants but does not add that the manager had learned in the 
course of his work that the tenant's husband was out of town for the weekend, and that the assault 
occurred in the tenant's apartment, to which the manager had a passkey. See Ponticas, 331 N.W. 
2d at 909. 
Huber creates the impression that the theory of negligent hiring was another of the Founders' 
recent inventions. But this theory dates back at least to the 1920s. See Davis v. Merrill, 133 Va. 69, 
80, 112 S.E. 628, 631 (1922) (railroad liable for assault committed by gatekeeper; character investi-
gation would have revealed his police record as a drunkard and his tendency to become dangerously 
infuriated on slight provocation); see also Henderson v. Nolting First Mortgage Corp., 184 Ga. 724, 
736-37, 193 S.E. 347, 353-54 (1937) (mortgagee in control of premises liable for negligent retention 
of employee who shot tenant when mortgagee knew that employee had vicious character); Zerder v. 
Friman Holding Co., 153 Misc. 225, 226, 274 N.Y.S. 588, 589 (1934) (landlord liable when em-
ployee stole tenant's property). 
123. P. HUBER, supra note 55, at 76; see J. PAGE, supra note 14, §§ 12.1-12.20, at 315-38 (dis-
cussing liability of dramshop owners for harm caused by intoxicated persons). Huber also mentions 
a recent case in which the court imposed liability upon a social host for negligently serving alcohol 
to intoxicated guests who then drove carelessly and injured plaintiffs. P. HUBER, supra note 55, at 
76 (citing Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984)). He notes that courts made similar 
initiatives in other states but were overruled by statute. Id. He fails to note, however, the inconsis-
tency between these decisions and enterprise liability theory: social hosts are in no better position 
than their guests to bear and distribute losses from highway accidents due to drunk driving. 
124. P. HUBER, supra note 55, at 77. The case he discusses is Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of 
California, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976) (en bane); see infra note 195 and 
accompanying text. 
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way. When it is foreseeable that one person might cause harm to another, 
then a duty to act reasonably toward that individual may arise.125 Courts 
often weigh other considerations, such as moral blame, deterrence, the con-
venience of administering the specific legal rule, and the capacity of the par-
ties to bear loss.126 Thus, if the burdens of imposing or extending an 
obligation to prevent foreseeable harm outweigh the benefits, the courts may 
be justified in not recognizing the duty.t27 
Second, foreseeability is a major component of the negligence formula. At 
trial, the jury sets the defendant's standard of care128 by calculating the grav-
ity of harm that might have been expected to occur if the defendant had 
failed to take reasonable precautions and then discounting it by the likeli-
hood that the harm would occur.129 If there is no foreseeable harm, then the 
defendant cannot be faulted for failing to meet what the plaintiff claims 
should have been the standard of care, and the defendant must not be found 
negligent.130 
Third-party assault cases provide an illustration. In these cases, a court 
must determine whether occupiers of business premises have any legal obli-
gation to use due care to protect invitees from foreseeable criminal assaults. 
If occupiers fail to take reasonable precautions to prevent assaults, harm 
could result to invitees. Yet this alone should not suffice to justify a legal 
125. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 12, § 53, at 358. 
126. See id. at 359. For an illuminating analysis of the duty element, see generally Green, The 
Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 CoLUM. L. REv. 1014 (1928) [hereinafter Green, The Duty 
Problem I] (defining test for duty and outlining five factors as being significant in influencing deter-
mination of duties: administrative, moral, economic, prophylactic or preventive, and justice); 
Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases: II, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 255 (1929) [hereinafter 
Green, The Duty Problem II] (concluding discussion of above factors and exploring scope of duty in 
the following categories of cases: master and servant, landowners and intruders, and railroad cross-
ings and automobiles). 
127. For example, even though it may be foreseeable that defendant's failure to use reasonable 
care to aid a stranger in peril might cause harm to the stranger, courts have routinely refused to 
impose an affirmative obligation in such cases unless there is a "special relationship" between the 
parties. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 12, §56, at 375-77. The difficulty of adminis-
tering the duty has been identified as a major factor underlying the no-duty rule. /d. at 376; see also 
Henderson, Process Constraints in Tort, 67 CoRNELL L. REv. 901, 928-43 (1982) (duty to rescue 
stranger in peril would be too difficult to administer judicially). For a thorough economic study 
concluding that the no-duty rule promotes economic efficiency, see Landes & Posner, Salvors, Find-
ers, Good Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 83 (1978). 
128. Reasonable foreseeability is a question of fact to be decided by the jury as part of its func-
tion to determine whether or not a defendant was negligent. In the absence of credible evidence 
upon which the factfinders can base a finding of reasonable foreseeability, the trial judge should 
conclude that there was no negligence as a matter of law and direct a verdict for the defendant. 
129. For a discussion of the negligence formula, see supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
130. For criticism of how some courts have erroneously used foreseeability to determine whether 
defendant owed a duty to plaintiff rather than whether defendant breached a duty, see Green, The 
Duty Problem I, supra note 126, at 1029-33. 
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duty, because the critical question is whether the benefits from imposing such 
a legal obligation would outweigh the burdens upon society. The courts 
must weigh carefully131 considerations such as the capacity of the torts pro-
cess to administer the rule fairly132 and the financial hardships the rule might 
impose upon enterprises, especially in high crime areas. 133 
Once the court recognizes a general duty, it must decide whether the duty 
has been breached in an individual case. Plaintiff has the burden of showing 
a reasonably foreseeable risk of a criminal assault on the premises, 134 as well 
as the amount of care that the defendant should have exercised to prevent the 
harm. 135 The level of precaution will vary, in part, according to the degree of 
foreseeable risk. 136 
It is, however, off the mark to equate the imposition of a duty of due care 
with enterprise liability, which does not require finding a breach of the duty 
of reasonable care. In third-party assault cases, claimants gain a chance to 
recover from solvent defendants in situations in which they might otherwise 
bear the full costs of their own injuries, but only if they can prove that de-
fendants were negligent. Perhaps Huber is suggesting that courts have some-
how crossed the line separating negligence from strict liability; but with his 
131. The courts do not always give careful consideration to all factors in the negligence formula. 
For an example of a recent decision recognizing the duty without weighing the benefits and burdens 
of the rule, see Madden v. C & K Barbecue Carryout, Inc., 758 S.W.2d 59 (Mo. 1988) (en bane). 
The majority stated that: "The touchstone for the creation of a duty is foreseeability. A duty of care 
arises out of circumstances in which there is a foreseeable likelihood that particular acts or omis-
sions will cause harm or injury." Id. at 62. 
132. See Williams v. Cunningham Drug Stores, 429 Mich. 495, 502-03, 418 N.W.2d 381, 384-85 
(1988) (merchant's duty to protect invitees against criminal attacks would necessarily be so vague 
that defendants would be unable to determine how to comply); see also Taco Bell, Inc. v. Lannon, 
744 P.2d 43, 51 (Colo. 1987) (Erickson, J., dissenting) ("[G]iven the unpredictability of criminal 
behavior it is unfair to impose a duty to provide armed guards upon business owners because busi-
nesses would not know whether the duty is theirs or whether they have performed it."). 
133. See J. PAGE, supra note 14, at 300 (weighing the desirability ofimposing the costs of crime 
prevention on occupiers from the perspectives of fairness, efficiency, and social policy). For a recent 
case holding that a motel owner had no duty to protect patrons of an adjacent dinner theater from 
risks of assaults in the motel parking lot because, among other factors, the cost of imposing such a 
duty would be prohibitive, see Wright v. Webb, 234 Va. 527, 531, 362 S.E.2d 919, 921 (1987); cf. 
Taco Bell, Inc., 144 P.2d at 49 (reasonable measures to protect patrons of fast-food restaurant from 
foreseeable criminal assaults would be relatively inexpensive). But see Sharpe v. Peter Pan Bus 
Lines, Inc., 401 Mass. 788, 797-98, 519 N.E.2d 1341, 1347 (1988) (Lynch, J., dissenting) (holding 
bus company liable for failing to protect patron from unprovoked knife attack would increase trans-
portation costs to onerous levels for working-class people). 
134. See Galloway v. Bankers Trust Co., 420 N.W.2d 437 (Iowa 1988) (evidence of prior history 
of shoplifting, trespass, vandalism, robbery, and assault on young boy sufficient to raise jury ques-
tion whether homosexual rape in mall restroom was reasonably foreseeable). 
135. On the standard of care in third-party assault cases involving business premises, see J. 
PAGE, supra note 14, § 11.8, at 301-02. 
136. See Toscano Lopez v. McDonald's, 193 Cal. App. 3d 495, 509, 238 Cal. Rptr. 436, 444 
(1987) (fast-food restaurant not liable for failing to prevent mass murder by heavily armed, suicidal 
gunman; when burden of deterring harm is great, high degree of foreseeability is required). 
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facile analysis, he has failed to substantiate the claim.137 
Huber's trip-hammer criticism of pro-plaintiff tort rules and the way 
courts have applied them creates the impression of a tort system out of con-
trol. He parades what he calls the "have-you-heard-the-latest stories"138 to 
argue that tort law has now become the object of derision. Yet many of his 
"stories" turn out not to be absurd when one is informed of facts that Huber 
conveniently omits.139 Indeed, several examples that Huber cites as judicial 
137. For an argument that the definition of foreseeability in premises liability cases involving 
third-party assaults "often has the effect of blurring the edges between negligence and strict liabil-
ity," see Hanson & Thomas, Third Party Tort Remedies for Crime Victims-Searching/or the "Deep 
Pocket" and a Risk Free Society, 18 STETSON L. REV. 1, 33 (1988). 
A distinction that would support the rejection of strict enterprise liability in third-party assault 
claims might rest upon the notion that defendants in these cases do not exercise the same degree of 
risk control that the manufacturers of products enjoy. The latter have exclusive authority over the 
production, design, and marketing of the goods they sell, while the former have limited power to 
control the activities of third-party criminals. On control of risk as a key element of enterprise 
liability, see supra note 26. 
138. P. HuBER, supra note 55, at 220. Among the cases he mentions (without citation) is the 
jury award of $986,000 to the woman who claimed to have lost her psychic powers as a result of a 
CAT scan, and the judgment against a telephone booth manufacturer in favor of a man injured in a 
booth that a drunk driver leveled. Id. He had previously mentioned the "prankster" who recov-
ered against a building owner for injuries sustained in the course of a burglary when the prankster 
fell through a painted skylight about which the owner had not warned, id. at 55, and the holding 
that an automobile manufacturer might be liable for not designing a car roof strong enough to 
withstand the impact of a runaway horse that landed on the roof after a frontal collision, id. at 39. 
139. Long before the publication of Huber's Liability, serious doubts were raised about the valid-
ity of these "horror stories." The phone booth case gained widespread publicity when President 
Ronald Reagan recounted it in a speech to the American Tort Reform Association. See Reagan 
Hits Jury Awards, Wash. Post, May 31, 1986, at A9, col. 1. 
Charles Bigbee, the man who lost his leg in the phone booth incident, subsequently appeared 
before a congressional committee to express his dismay that the President of the United States had 
distorted and trivialized his tragedy. He described how he had been unable to open the jammed 
door of the booth when he saw a car coming at him off a busy intersection where there had been 
prior similar accidents. The Liability Insurance Crisis, Pt. I: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Eco-
nomic Stabilization of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 14, 45-47 (1986) (statement of Charles Bigbee) [hereinafter The Liability Insurance Crisis]. 
Moreover, the evidence at trial was inconclusive on whether the driver was actually drunk. See 
Bigbee v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 34 Cal. 3d 49, 58 n.13, 665 P.2d 947, 952 n.13, 192 Cal. Rptr. 857, 
862 n.13 (1983) (investigating police officer opined that driver's blood-alcohol level exceeded legal 
limit but no blood-alcohol or other chemical sobriety test was performed). For further criticism of 
the anecdotal use of Bigbee, see Brill & Lyons, The Not-So-Simple Crisis, AM. LAW., May 1986, at 
1, 16. 
At the same congressional hearing, the plaintiff in the "horse-on-the-roof" case described how his 
wife was crushed to death when a horse crashed through the roof of the car he was driving. The 
Liability Insurance Crisis, supra, at 14-16, 48-50 (statement of Steven Green). He claimed that in 
Oregon, where the accident occurred, about 120 auto accidents a year involve horses. Id. For 
comments by the trial judge in the case, see 60 Minutes: Insurance Crisis (CBS television broadcast, 
Jan. 10, 1988), transcript at 11 (transcript on file at The Georgetown Law Journal) ("Out here in the 
West, horse and automobile collisions are not terribly unusual ...• If this case had been a simple 
rollover, where the Ford had rolled over and exactly the same thing occurred, the roof crushed, 
killed the passenger, with exactly the same degree of force placed on the roof that occurred when 
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overstepping have become examples of judicial backpedaling140-perhaps 
demonstrating the self-corrective capacity of the common law. 
the horse hit the roof, you probably would never have heard of this case."); see also Brill & Lyons, 
supra, at 14 (criticizing anecdotal account of case in FoRBES magazine). 
For supplemental facts from the "burglar·and·the-skylight" case, see The Liability Insurance Cri-
sis, supra, at 7-8, 31-33 (statement of Joan Claybrook, President, Public Citizen). In this case, the 
plaintiff was a recent high school graduate who had climbed onto the high school roof in search of a 
floodlight to illunrinate a nearby basketball court. The skylight he stepped through was covered 
with tar and indistinguishable from the roof. Moreover, not only did school officials know workers 
and students occasionally walked on the roof, but a similar accident had occurred in same school 
district eight months earlier. 
The trial judge in the "psychic-and-the-CAT-scan" case overturned the jury's verdict and or-
dered a new trial because of a lack of evidence on the causation issue. For a statement by the judge 
describing the case, see 60 Minutes: Insurance Crisis, supra, transcript at 13; see also Power, An 
Essay on Tort Litigation and the Media, 40 OKLA. L. REv. 35, 36 (1987) (criticizing newspaper 
accounts which left impression that plaintiff in CAT-scan case had recovered large amount on pre-
posterous claim). A careful reading of Huber's endnotes is necessary to figure out the result reached 
in this case. SeeP. HUBER, supra note 54, at 251 (citing Judge Rejects Damage Award to Psychic, 
Wash. Post, Aug. 9, 1986, at A7, col. 1). 
The use of factually misleading anecdotes by critics of the tort system is at least a change of pace 
from the prior practice of inventing cases out of whole cloth. See Product Liability Insurance, supra 
note 2, at 2 (statement of John J. LaFalce, Chairperson of the Subcommittee on Economic Stabiliza-
tion) (describing repeated reports during the 1970s of case in which man who used his lawnmower 
to trim hedges injured his arm and won substantial jury verdict; investigation revealed that no such 
case existed). 
140. He mentions a decision by a California intermediate appellate court reversing a trial court's 
dismissal of a claim for negligent counseling against a church and its pastors by the parents of a 
young man who committed suicide. P. HUBER, supra note 54, at 77, 183 (citing Nally v. Grace 
Community Church of the Valley, 157 Cal. App. 3d 912, 204 Cal. Rptr. 303 (1984)). Huber does 
not add that the California Supreme Court ordered that the opinion not be officially published. Id. 
On retrial, the court again granted defendants' motion for a nonsuit and the intermediate appellate 
court again reversed. 194 Cal. App. 3d 1147, 240 Cal. Rptr. 215, 229-30 (1987). The California 
Supreme Court reversed, holding that pastoral nontherapeutic counselors had no duty to refer a 
potentially suicidal person to a professional therapist, and therefore could not be held liable for 
negligently failing to prevent a suicide. 47 Cal. 3d 218, 299-300, 763 P.2d 948, 960-61, 253 Cal. 
Rptr. 97, 109-10 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1644 (1989). 
Huber also mentions lower court decisions in California and New Jersey permitting plaintiffs to 
recover for loss of consortium against defendants who negligently injured plaintiffs' nonmarital 
cohabiting partners. P. HUBER, supra note 54, at 126 (citing Butcher v. Superior Court of Orange 
County, 139 Cal. App. 3d 58, 188 Cal. Rptr. 503 (1983), and Bulloch v. United States, 487 F. Supp. 
1078 (D.N.J. 1980) (applying New Jersey law)). The California Supreme Court, however, citing the 
overwhelming weight of authority both in other jurisdictions and in the California lower courts, has 
recently held that even parties to a stable and significant relationship do not have a cause of action 
for loss of consortium resulting from injuries to a nonmarital cohabiting partner. Elden v. Sheldon, 
46 Cal. 3d 267,277-79 758 P.2d 582, 589-90,250 Cal. Rptr. 254,261-62 (1988). The Bulloch court, 
relying upon Butcher, has proved to be off the mark in its prediction that New Jersey courts would 
recognize the action. See Sykes v. Zook Enters., Inc., 215 N.J. Super. 461, 467, 521 A.2d 1380, 
1383 (Law Div. 1987) (plaintiff who admitted absence of marriage with decedent and who styled 
herself only as decedent's "purported wife" had no right of recovery for loss of consortium), aff'd 
sub nom. Sykes v. Propane Power Corp., 224 N.J. 686, 541 A.2d 271 (1988); Leonardis v. Morton 
Chem. Co., 184 N.J. Super. 10, 11, 445 A.2d 45, 46 (App. Div. 1982) (wife's right to recover for loss 
of consortium resulting from husband's injury is founded on marriage and absent such relationship, 
the right does not exist). 
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IV. TORT LAW AND DETERRENCE 
Huber takes particular aim at the deterrence function of tort law. Hear-
gues that the tort system delivers less safety than it might for two reasons: 
first, because it discourages socially useful scientific and technological inno-
vation; 141 and second, because it either disregards or fails to give adequate 
weight to the negative effects that tort liability can produce.142 
As Huber admits, the extent to which tort law actually deters safety inno-
vation is difficult to establish. 143 Nonetheless, he presses the point that on 
balance tort law has had a negative effect on safety. 144 Resting his case on a 
number of specific examples, he lays blame at the door of the tort system for 
the decrease in research in contraception, 145 vaccines, 146 so-called "orphan 
drugs," 147 and aviation technology. 148 
The extent to which tort law should bear responsibility for corporate deci-
sions to reduce expenditures for research and development is not nearly so 
clear-cut as Huber would have readers believe. He refers to statements by 
company officials claiming that their companies are not spending money to 
develop new products because they fear liability suits. 149 But these assertions 
141. "As the tort system expanded, innovation was suppressed, not encouraged. Safety was set 
back, not advanced. And the consumer ended worse off, even in his personal security, than he 
would have been had the legal system been slower to rush to his rescue." P. HUBER, supra note 55, 
at 154. 
142. "A drug maker can always make a product less risky by making it less potent; a vaccine 
manufacturer can always further weaken a weakened virus at the cost of weakening the immune 
response it triggers. But in case after case, the product's efficacy goes hand in hand with its risks, 
and less efficacy means more danger of a different sort-from the disease the medicine is supposed 
to cure or prevent." Id. at 162. 
143. "Counting the bodies that have fallen because of things that might have been done better 
but weren't will always remain an exercise in speculation .... " Id. at 161. The dimensions of the 
problem have been termed "unknown and probably unknowable." Broad, Does the Fear of Litiga-
tion Dampen the Drive to Innovate?, N.Y. Times, May 12, 1987, at C1, col. 1. 
144. "One surely cannot say that every single time the tort system slows down or cuts off innova-
tion it thereby impedes safety. But by all indications that is the result more often than not." P. 
HUBER, supra note 55, at 161. 
Whether Huber still holds to this view is questionable. According to Robert E. Litan, Director of 
the Economic Studies Program at the Brookings Institution, he and Huber are the coleaders of a 
study project designed to explore whether the tort system has a positive or negative effect on the 
safety of consumers and workers. See Letter from Robert E. Litan to Joseph A. Page (May 6, 1989) 
(copy on file at The Georgetown Law Journal) Qetter with attached project proposal). A fair as-
sumption is that one would not accept the leadership of a study project designed to explore an issue 
that one has already prejudged. However, Huber has yet to recant the certitude he expressed in 
Liability. 
145. P. HuBER, supra note 55, at 155. For a discussion of the factors inhibiting innovation in the 
field of contraception, see infra note 152. 
146. P. HuBER, supra note 55, at 156. For a discussion of the unique nature of the vaccine-
liability problem, see infra note 155. 
147. P. HuBER, supra note 55, at 158-59. For a discussion of orphan drugs, see infra note 151. 
148. P. HUBER, supra note 55, at 156. 
149. See id. at 155-56. 
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could be self-serving, promoting the corporation's interest in creating a cli-
mate for pro-defendant modifications of product liability law.150 Or such 
statements could conceal other factors that motivated the decision not to 
innovate. For example, profits from the sale of a particular product might 
not be high enough to justify further research expenditures.151 Political pres-
sures emanating from groups that oppose birth contr~l or abortion might 
have contributed to cutbacks in research and development in the contracep-
tive industry. 152 The possibility that concerns about the liability system are 
150. See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text. For a corporate executive's call for such re-
form, see Mahoney, The Courts Are Curbing Creativity, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1988, at F3, col. 1 
(corporate executive, claiming development of new products abandoned because of liability fears, 
urged federal limits on punitive damages and other changes to punitive damages rules). 
151. Huber cites orphan drugs as an example of products kept from the market because the 
threat of tort suits makes them uninsurable. P. HuBER, supra note 55, at 159. He fails to explain to 
his readers, however, the principal barrier to the marketing of these products. Orphan drugs are 
pharmaceuticals designed to treat rare diseases found in small populations. The modest size of the 
market and high costs of development mean low profitability for manufacturers of these drugs. See 
Lasagna, Who Will Adopt the Orphan Drugs?, 3 REGULATION 27, 31 (1979). Congress addressed 
the problem several years ago by enacting the Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 
(1983) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360aa-dd (1982 & Supp. V 1987)), designed to accelerate the ap-
proval process for new orphan drugs, provide tax credit incentives for companies willing to develop 
these drugs, and offer exclusive marketing rights on unpatentable orphan drugs for a period of seven 
years. See H.R. REP. No. 840, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 1, at 5 (1982). 
A witness at congressional hearings on amendments to the Orphan Drug Act cited tort liability 
as a continuing barrier to the development of certain orphan drugs in addition to the importation of 
orphan drugs currently available overseas. See Drug Issues: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. 
41-42, 51-52 (1987) (testimony of AbbeyS. Meyers, Executive Director, National Organization for 
Rare Disorders) (liability insurance is a "major issue of concern" inhibiting development of orphan 
drugs). 
Huber offers the example of thalidomide as an orphan drug useful in the treatment of leprosy but 
kept from the U.S. market by a German manufacturer concerned about potential tort liability. P. 
HUBER, supra note 55, at 159. Thalidomide is notorious for having caused serious birth defects in 
the children of mothers who took the drug as a tranquilizer during the 1950s, but has been found to 
be efficacious in the experimental treatment of leukemia victims who have had bone-marrow trans-
plants and in treatment of victims of rare diseases. See Squires, The Other Side of Thalidomide, 
Wash. Post, June 20, 1989, Health at 9, col. 1. Despite its effectiveness, one medical researcher has 
stated that drug companies are not interested in the drug because of a fear of lawsuits. I d. at 10, col. 
3. 
Blaming the tort system for the limited availability of thalidomide seems rather lame. It is diffi-
cult to imagine how liability might flow from the use of the drug if it were fully and adequately 
labeled and marketed to a small population suffering from rare diseases. The use of a properly 
worded informed-consent form might obviate the possibility of tort litigation. See infra notes 193-
94 and accompanying text. 
152. Huber stresses the effect that tort law has had in deterring innovation in the development of 
contraceptives. P. HUBER, supra note 55, at 155; see also Djerassi, The Future of Birth Control, 
Wash. Post, Sept. 10, 1989, at Cl, col. 1 (industry virtually abandoned research on contraception 
because of liability litigation); Sanger, JJirth Control: New Options But Old Ideas; Contraceptives in 
Demand Amid Swelling Liability and Shrinking Research, Newsday, Mar. 27, 1988, at 78, col. 1 
(fear of large settlements inhibits development of male pill and other breakthroughs); cf. Dullea, 
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irrational153 or exaggerated154 cannot be discounted. Furthermore, it is con-
ceivable that some of the examples cited in Liability are really atypical situa-
tions rather than symptoms of the general failure of the tort system. If this is 
so, ad hoc remedies might be more appropriate than systemic reform. 155 
Huber asserts that the tort system discriminates against innovation by 
overestimating the new risks associated with new technologies. 156 He cites 
neither authority nor facts to substantiate this claim. The shift from negli-
gence to strict liability in design cases did, in theory, require juries in product 
design cases to pass judgment upon the defectiveness of products rather than 
the conduct ofmanufacturers. 157 But there is no evidence to suggest that the 
courts apply this standard differently in products liability suits involving new 
technologies than in those implicating familiar products. Even if the courts 
treat new risks more stringently than old risks, Huber has elsewhere offered 
Liability Crisis Complicates Contraception, N.Y. Times, May 19, 1986, at B8, col. 2 (litigation over 
IUD has caused manufacturers to pull product from market, limiting birth control options). 
A recent article on developments in the birth control industry reports that political and business 
concerns, in addition to worry over potential liability, have contributed to a worldwide decrease of 
nearly 25% in contraceptive research spending in the past 15 years (a trend that can hardly be 
blamed upon tort suits, at least with respect to foreign research and development). Freudenheim, 
Birth Control Industry Is Taking a New Shape, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1989, at D1, col. 4; see Glad-
well, Birth Control Makers Weary of Controversy: Liability Problems Limit Contraception Choices as 
Drug Firms Leave Field, L.A. Times, May 3, 1988, pt. IV, at 15, col. 1 (low profits and negative 
publicity stemming from right-to-life and women's groups have hindered research and development 
of contraceptives). 
For discussion of the reasons why American companies may not want to market the so-called 
abortion pill (RU 486) currently sold in France, see Chapman, The Politics of the Abortion Pill, 
Wash. Post, Oct. 3, 1989, Health at 13, col. 1 (fear of liability suits and boycotts by anti-abortion 
groups); Abrams, Politics, Profits and a New Pill: U.S. Women May Never Have Access to RU 486 
for Abortions, Newsday, Dec. 13, 1988, at 1, col. I (RU 486 controversy generated by anti-abortion 
groups, liability risks, and lower profit potential compared to other drugs); Kalata, Any Sale in U.S. 
of Abortion Pill Still Years Away, N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1988, at A1, col. 1 (unavailability caused by 
high research costs, relatively low profit potential, and liability risks). 
153. The failure to market thalidomide to a carefully delineated group of victims of rare diseases 
provides a good example. 
154. Physicians' fears that Good Samaritan acts will result in malpractice suits are but one exam-
ple. See infra notes 179-84 and accompanying text. 
155. The treatment of liability for adverse reactions to vaccines is an example. Because certain 
childhood w.::cines are required by law and are known to cause a relatively low incidence of adverse 
reactions, it makes sense to have a mechanism by which victims of these reactions may be compen-
sated, rather than to rely exclusively upon the tort system. See V. Schwartz & L. Mahshigian, supra 
note 49, at 393-94. 
On the other hand, the public demand for vaccines against diseases such as AIDS raises the 
possibility that manufacturers will take advantage of the situation and claim they are reluctant to 
develop such products because ofliability fears, when their real objective is to persuade Congress to 
pass legislation that will limit their potential liability. For a discussion of the liability issue as it 
relates to the development of an AIDS vaccine, see Gladwell, supra note 69. 
156. See P. HUBER, supra note 55, at 157-58. 
157. This distinction may be more theoretical than real. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying 
text. 
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persuasive reasons why, apart from tort liability, society might be justified in 
regulating new risks more stringently than old.tss 
Huber criticizes recent decisions abandoning the "repairs doctrine"159 by 
permitting plaintiffs to introduce into evidence post-accident changes in the 
design of a product or in the warnings or instructions accompanying it.160 
His criticism creates the misleading impression that there is a decisional 
trend toward discarding the repairs doctrine. In fact, the repairs doctrine is 
alive and quite wel1. 161 In his haste to buttress the charge that tort law dis-
courages safety innovation, Huber couples his expression of dismay at the 
rejection of the repairs doctrine with the suggestion that under strict liability, 
courts measure the design of the product in question against products cur-
rently being marketed. He claims that a court may find a product manufac-
tured many years ago to be defective for not meeting the technological 
standards of today.I62 This proposition is flatly erroneous. Courts routinely 
judge the design of products according to the state of the art at the time the 
product was marketed, not according to the state of the art at the time of the 
trial.t63 
Huber faults the tort system for ignoring safety disincentives that might 
158. See Huber, Risk Regulation, supra note 59, at 1027-28 (old risks are associated with settled 
production and consumption choices and established technologies; regulation of old risks often in-
volves substantial economic, social, and political obstacles, and high transaction costs; regulation of 
new risks involves lost opportunity costs to be borne by those who may be neither identifiable nor 
aware of what is at stake). I am indebted to Professor Gary T. Schwartz of tlte UCLA School of 
Law for this insight regarding Huber's argument. 
159. P. HUBER, supra note 55, at 159. The repairs doctrine, which excludes evidence of post-
accident repairs, rests upon the conviction that admitting evidence of tltese repairs would discour-
age manufacturers from making safety-enhancing improvements because jurors might view them as 
an admission of liability. Even if the evidence is admitted for a purpose other than to prove negli-
gence or defectiveness, proponents of the repairs doctrine are concerned that jurors will not be able 
to make such fine distinctions and the defendant will inevitably be prejudiced. See 1 M. MADDEN, 
supra note 88, § 12.11, at 518-24. 
160. P. HUBER, supra note 55, at 159-60. 
161. See 1 M. MADDEN, supra note 88, § 12.11, at 518-24 (citing cases). 
162. SeeP. HUBER, supra note 55, at 160 ("When the sun never sets on the possibility oflitiga-
tion, each improvement in method, material, or design can establish a new standard against which 
all of your earlier undertakings, of no matter what vintage, will then be judged."), at 96 ("An 
endless clock on litigation allows each improvement in technology, material, or design to set a new 
standard against which all earlier undertakings are then judged, so that progress itself becomes a 
reason for litigation."). 
163. See, e.g., Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 544 F.2d 442, 447 (10tlt Cir. 1976) (airplane 
judged by state of the art when manufactured in 1952 and not as technology existed in 1970); 
Boatland of Houston, Inc. v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d 743, 746-48 (fex. 1980) (fishing boat judged by 
state of the art when sold in 1973 and not at time of trial); M. SHAPO, THE LAW OF PRODUCTS 
LIABILITY § 8.07[6][b], at 8-40 (1987) ("new advances in safety technology [do] not necessarily 
mean that products previously manufactured are defective"); Spradley, Defensive Use of State of the 
Art Evidence in Strict Products Liability, 67 MINN. L. REv. 343, 430-33 (1982) ("In negligence 
cases, courts have long held that a defendant's product is judged by the state of the art as it existed 
at the time of manufacture or sale."). 
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flow from the imposition of liability. He argues that tort law's unpredictabil-
ity, its assessment of foresight through the lens of hindsight, 164 and its em-
brace of rules such as joint and several liability165 fail to make adequate 
distinctions between those who have been careless and those who have been 
careful. Thus, the risk of tort liability may deter the latter from engaging in 
socially useful activity that is also dangerous. In addition, the risk of tort 
liability may encourage alternative conduct that turns out to be riskier than 
conduct already deemed negligent, or it may provide incentives for the man-
ufacture of alternative products that tum out to be more dangerous than 
products already found defective. 
Tort law, of course, does not intend these consequences. It permits courts 
to consider safety trade-offs to determine whether a defendant is negligent or 
whether a product design is defective. 166 Both applications of the test are 
flexible enough to include, within the scope of the cost-of-avoidance factor, a 
balancing of any adverse effects that might flow from a finding of liability.t67 
How well the torts process performs this balancing is a matter of some 
dispute. 168 
164. Huber asserts that "[d]ecisions made on the fly, in rescue situations, or amid ignorance, 
when truly new products are being designed, can be second-guessed in an inquest on negligence or 
defectiveness that will be held with the benefit of calm, eagle-eyed hindsight." P. HUBER, supra 
note 55, at 164. He offers no evidence of results wrongly reached as a result of this process of 
"second-guessing." For a contrary perpective on cases involving rescue situations, see Recent Legis-
lation, 15 HARV. L. REv. 641, 642 (1962) (courts seem to consider emergency circumstances and do 
not treat the Good Samaritan unfairly). 
165. The rule of joint and several liability does not impose liability upon a non-negligent party, 
but rather exposes a defendant to the risk of full liability for harm tortiously caused even though 
other parties might also have contributed to that harm. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 
12, § 47, at 328-30. In comparative fault jurisdictions, the rule creates a possibility that a wealthy 
tortfeasor might pay a greater share of a verdict than the percentage of fault for which he has been 
found responsible if other tortfeasors turn out to be judgment-proof. See generally Pressler & 
Schieffer, Joint and Several Liability: A Case for Reform, 64 DEN. U.L. REv. 651 (1988). For a 
defense of joint and several liability, see Wright, Allocating Responsibility Among Multiple Responsi-
ble Causes: A Principled Defense of Joint and Several Liability for Actual Harm and Risk Exposure, 
21 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1141 (1988); see also Twerski, The Joint Tortfeasor Legislative Revolt: A 
Rational Response to the Critics, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1125 (1989); Wright, Throwing out the 
Baby with the Bathwater: A Reply to Professor Twerski, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1147 (1989). 
166. See supra note 94. 
167. See Olson v. Arctic Enter., Inc., 349 F. Supp. 761 (D.N.D. 1972). In Olson, the plaintiff 
caught his foot in an unguarded metal track and sprocket drive mechanism in the rear of a snowmo-
bile, causing permanent injury to his foot. /d. at 763. Ruling for the defendant on the negligent 
design claim, the court noted the dangers that would have been created by adoption of rubber 
tracks. /d. at 765. 
168. One of the controversies surrounding product design litigation derives from the charge that 
trade-offs involving technological feasibility and safety are so multifaceted that the tort system can-
not resolve them in a principled way. Compare R. EPSTEIN, supra note 88, at 84-88 (judge cannot 
make the "multiple, delicate, marginal determinations" necessary to evaluate the cost-benefit trade-
off (emphasis in original)) and Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design 
Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 CoLUM. L. REv. 1531, 1577-78 (1973) (establishing prod-
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Huber entertains no doubts on this score. He insists that despite its good 
intentions, modem tort law either fails to pay any heed to risk trade-offs or 
evaluates trade-offs in a way that diminishes net safety..l69 But his evidence is 
sketchy and does not bear the weight of his overstated argument. 
Huber argues that by raising the costs of goods and services or by making 
them unavailable, tort law could decrease safety levels by forcing some con-
sumers to use risky alternatives or by forcing society to do without the bene-
fits of safety-enhancing goods and services.17° For example, if dealers of used 
products are held strictly liable in tort for defects in the goods· they sell, the 
price of these goods might rise to the point that some consumers could not 
afford to buy from used goods dealers. These people might seek out private 
individuals selling used goods on an occasional basis because such individu-
als would not be considered "sellers" for liability purposes and would sell 
used goods at a lower price.171 The goods that private individuals sold might 
be more defective, and hence more dangerous, than used goods that dealers 
sold.172 Huber makes this point, 173 but the problem is more complex than 
Huber leads his readers to believe. First, not every jurisdiction imposes strict 
uct safety standards is a polycentric problem best suited for legislative response rather than judicial 
adjudication) with M. SHAPO, supra note 163, § 9.09[2], at 9-14-15 ("a (properly instructed) jury 
can perform the necessary balancing test as well as any individual or agency" (quoting Bowman v. 
General Motors Corp., 427 F. Supp. 234, 242 (E.D. Pa. 1977)) andTwerski, Weinstein, Danaher & 
Piehler, The Use and Abuse of Warnings in Products Liability: Design Defect Litigation Comes of 
Age, 61 CoRNELL L. REv. 495, 525-28 (1976) (design defect cases are not truly polycentric and 
courts are competent to judge them). 
169. P. HUBER, supra note 55, at 11-15. 
170. /d. 
171. Strict liability in tort is limited to those engaged in the business of selling products. See 
REsTATEMENT, supra note 83, § 402A(l)(a). 
Huber refers, without citation, to recent cases attempting to extend strict liability to "ordinary 
citizens selling cars through the classified ads" and calls this a "seemingly logical step." P. HUBER, 
supra note 55, at 39. In his haste to cast every negative aspersion possible upon tort law, he fails to 
mention the "logical" reasons that cut against imposing strict liability upon occasional sellers not in 
the business of selling products. For example, the common law has traditionally deemed those who 
have entered into the business of selling products to have undertaken a special responsibility for the 
safety of the public. See REsTATEMENT, supra note 83, § 402A comment f. In addition, enterprise 
liability has been advanced as a reason for imposing strict liability upon those in the business of 
selling used products to the public. See Note, Sales of Defective Used Products: Should Strict Liabil-
ity Apply?, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 805, 811-14 (1979) (by G. Highland). This rationale is inapplicable 
to occasional sellers not in the used product business. 
172. This argument is developed in detail in Henderson, The Boundaries of Strict Products Lia-
bility: Implications of the Theory of the Second Best, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 1036 passim (1980) (ex-
tending strict liability to sellers will result in net safety loss if other sellers exist who are not subject 
to strict liability). 
173. "Providers who are illegal, anonymous, or too small to bother with also gain a competitive 
edge over established and reputable providers every time the liability vise is tightened. A second-
hand sale through the classified ads is promoted over a sale through more customary sales chan-
nels." P. HUBER, supra note 55, at 165. 
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liability upon dealers of used products.174 Those that hold dealers strictly 
liable in tort limit the rule to situations in which dealers perform defective 
work or repairs, or install defective replacement parts. 175 Because dealers 
owe a duty of reasonable care when they recondition used products or install 
replacement parts, it is not clear how much the switch to strict liability 
causes the price of used products to increase, nor is it clear the extent to 
which this switch forces some consumers to buy allegedly more dangerous 
products from occasional private sellers rather than from dealers. 
A specific instance that Huber cites to illustrate tort law's capacity to en-
courage more dangerous products is the controversy over the Bic disposable 
cigarette lighter, which allegedly may ignite without warning while in the 
pockets of users. 176 He claims that holding the manufacturer of these prod-
ucts liable for the harm they have caused might force their removal from the 
market, with the resulting substitution of refillable lighters that could cause 
more bum injuries in the long run. 177 The highly dubious assumption here is 
that industry will be unable to develop a disposable lighter that does not 
explode into flames at inappropriate moments.t78 
Huber finds yet another safety disincentive of the tort system in physi-
cians' unwillingness to play the "Good Samaritan" by stopping to aid acci-
dent victims who are strangers.179 Presumably, the rule that physicians have 
a duty to use reasonable care when they furnish emergency assistance fails to 
174. See, e.g., Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 61 Ill. 2d 17, 21, 329 N.E.2d 785, 787 
(1975) (used car dealer not strictly liable for defects not existing when car left manufacturer and not 
created by used car dealer); Grimes v. Axtell Ford Lincoln-Mercucy, 403 N.W.2d 781, 785 (Iowa 
1987) (dealers of used goods not strictly liable for latent defects not arising from design or manufac-
ture but caused by previous owner); Tillman v. Vance Equip. Co., 286 Or. 747, 757, 596 P.2d 1299, 
1304 (1979) (dealers in used goods not strictly liable when no representation of quality made beyond 
sale itself and no special relationship with manufacturer exists). 
175. See 1 M. MADDEN, supra note 88, § 3.26, at 95; see also M. SHAPO, supra note 163, 
§ 18.04[2][a], at 18-13 to -14 (although strongest case for imposing strict liability exists when seller 
rebuilds or reconditions products, some jurisdictions have extended the rule to cover those who 
have merely made "some inputs" into products). 
176. For a report on the defects associated with Bic lighters and the product liability suits these 
defects have engendered, see Lewin, Lawsuits, and Worry, Mount Over Bic Lighter, N.Y. Times, 
Apr. 10, 1987, at AI, col. 4. 
177. P. HuBER, supra note 55, at 66. 
178. Indeed, the claim has been made that the problem of inflammability is peculiar to the Bic 
lighter, and that other lighters on the market are designed in such a way as to minimize the risk of 
accidental ignitions. See Lewin, supra note 176, at D3, col. 2. 
For the use of the Bic litigation as an argument for "tort reform," see McConnell, Bic is Tort 
Plague's Latest Victim, Wall St. J., May 5, 1987, at 37, col. 1 (letter to the editor from Senator 
Mitch McConnell) (making the highly dubious assertion that liability will not depend upon who 
was at fault or responsible for the harm but will be imposed even though the manufacturer 
"designed the safest product possible"). 
179. P. HUBER, supra note 55, at 163. His hypothetical victim has been struck by a drunk driver 
and his hypothetical doctor is driving his "hard-won Cadillac." Fearing a malpractice suit if he 
stops to help, the doctor keeps driving. 
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take adequate (or any) notice of the risk averseness of physicians. Physicians 
faced with a duty of due care will be deterred from voluntary rescues because 
they fear being sued for negligence.1so 
The insight Huber offers here is that when individuals have no economic 
incentive to perform an act (as opposed to disposable-lighter manufacturers, 
who have economic incentives to develop pocket lighters that do not ex-
plode), they may refrain from acting because of a reluctance to incur the risk 
of tort liability. However, in the case of physicians unwilling to aid strangers 
in peril, there is more than meets the eye. Some years ago physicians vigor-
ously lobbied state legislatures to secure enactment of Good Samaritan laws 
limiting the liability of health care professionals who stop to render first aid 
to strangers.181 The physicians' principal argument was that they feared they 
might be sued if they volunteered to help strangers in peril. Yet no one was 
able to cite a single instance of a physician being sued under these circum-
stances.182 Therefore, no court had the opportunity to consider the possible 
adverse consequences of imposing a duty of reasonable care upon physicians 
who stop to render emergency assistance. Moreover, even after the enact-
ment of Good Samaritan laws that considerably narrowed the grounds upon 
which a doctor might be held liable, opinion surveys found that about half of 
the physicians polled would still not stop to render aid. 183 Thus, other rea-
sons besides an exaggerated fear of tort liability may have motivated physi-
cians' refusal to treat strangers in need.184 
Huber identifies the intrauterine device (IUD) as one of a handful of prod-
ucts that have fallen victim to litigation which on balance has achieved so-
180. Physicians may be concerned not only with the adverse psychological effects of being sued 
and the burden of having to defend, but also with unfair treatment by the judicial systeJD. These 
fears may be ill-founded, however. In Good Samaritan cases not involving physicians, the courts 
have not imposed unduly strict standards of care and have fully considered the emergency nature of 
the circumstances. See Recent Legislation, 15 HARV. L. REv. 641, 642 (1962). 
181. See MALPRACTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 15-16; see generally Note, Good Samaritans 
and Liability for Medical Malpractice, 64 CoLUM. L. REv. 1301 (1964). 
182. See A. HOLDER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW 9 (1975) ("surveys by the American Medi-
cal Association and others ... reveal that no such claims have been reported by physicians"); S. 
LAW & S. POLAN, supra note 35, at 117 (as of 1978, "there is not one single reported case, in any 
state, in the entire history of the country, in which a doctor has been held liable" for inadequate 
care provided to strangers in peril (emphasis in original)); MALPRACTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 
15 n.7 (no officially reported decisions as of 1973, but in one malpractice suit doctor pleaded the 
Hawaii Good Samaritan statute as a complete defense). For the first reported decision involving a 
malpractice suit against a physician who volunteered medical assistance, see Rodriguez v. New 
York City Health & Hosp, Corp., 132 Misc. 2d 705, 707-08, 505 N.Y.S.2d 345, 347 (1986) (Good 
Samaritan statute provided complete' defense because complaint failed to allege gross negligence). 
183. MALPRACTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 16. 
184. On the other hand, a belief that the Good Samaritan laws did not go far enough (perhaps 
even to the extent of providing complete immunity) in protecting physicians from lawsuits might 
also explain the results of the poll. For a detailed analysis of Good Samaritan laws, see generally 2 
M. BENDER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ch. 21 (1989). 
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cially undesirable results. He asserts that an avalanche of lawsuits forced 
from the market not only the infamous Dalkon Shield, 185 but also two other 
IUDs, the Copper-7 and the Lippes Loop. Huber suggests that although the 
Dalkon Shield deserved its fate, 186 the Copper-7 and Lippes Loop did not, 
because they were the safest effective options available to many women. 187 
He argues that because no alternatives are available, a number of unwanted 
pregnancies may occur.188 In addition, he avers that no IUD-maker could 
possibly provide the type of warnings that must accompany such products, 
and hence "the new law of warning further sharpens the anti-innovation bias 
of the new tort system."189 
The Copper-7, manufactured by G.D. Searle & Co., was withdrawn from 
the market in the wake of a barrage of lawsuits brought by women who suf-
fered pelvic inflammatory disorders and infertility allegedly as a result of 
using the device. 190 A major thrust of the plaintiffs' argument in what has 
been regarded as the breakthrough victory against Searle191 was that the 
Copper-7 could be used safely only by women who had already borne chil-
dren and had stable sexual relationships. Yet Searle had targeted a much 
larger (and more profitable) market-all women who might opt to use an 
IUD. 192 Thus, liability would properly flow from the negligent marketing of 
a product which caused harm that might have been avoided if the defendant 
had exercised due care. Instead of searching for an appropriate market and 
then labeling and promoting its product accordingly, the manufacturer chose 
to cease production altogether. Why this should cast a shadow upon the tort 
system rather than upon the manufacturer is not readily apparent. 
Huber's characterization that the court-imposed duty to warn is so oner-
ous that it discourages innovation in the development of IUDs is without 
185. For a detailed account of the sorry saga of the Dalkon Shield, seeM. MINTZ, AT ANY 
COST: CORPORATE GREED, WOMEN, AND THE DALKON SHIELD (1985). 
186. P. HUBER, supra note 55, at 162. This seems to be a backhanded admission by Huber that 
occasionally the tort system does some good. --
187. Id. at 41-42. 
188. Id. at 41-42, 162; see also Fox, Withdrawal from Market Seen Limiting Options, U.S. MED., 
Sept. 1986, at 2, 25 (estimating an increase of 123,000 unwanted pregnancies per year). 
189. P. HUBER, supra note 55, at 158. 
190. See Mintz, The Selling of an IUD, Wash. Post, Aug. 9, 1988, Health at 12; Hofmann, Suits 
Against Searle May Rise Following $8.75 Million Award, Bus. INs., Sept. 19, 1988, at 2. 
191. See Hofmann, supra note 190, at 12. For reported opinions, see Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & 
Co., 680 F. Supp. 1293, 1298-1301 (D. Minn. 1988) (federal law does not preempt product liability 
claim against medical device manufacturer); Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 695 F. Supp. 432, 433 
(D. Minn. 1988) (whether conduct of manufacturer was reasonable in developing product is a jury 
issue); Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 707 F. Supp. 1517, 1526, 1536 (D. Minn. 1989) (evidence 
supported jury's finding of intentional misrepresentation; defendant's motion for JNOV denied; jury 
award of $7 million in punitive damages not excessive). 
192. See Mintz, supra note 190, at 13 (quoting from a 1970 Searle memo claiming that the 
Copper-7 was also suitable for women who had not yet borne any children). 
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factual foundation. The one company that remained,jn the field has pio-
neered the development of an informed consent brochure, which seeks to 
ensure that only those women for whom the device is appropriate will use it 
and that any woman considering use of the product will be able to make an 
intelligent choice about her method of contraception.193 Another manufac-
turer that has entered the field has adopted a similar informed consent 
form.194 Products liability suits brought against IUD-makers on a failure-to-
warn or intentional misrepresentation theory may have contributed to the 
development of these innovative consent forms. 
This is not the first time that the tort system has played a role in bringing 
about a salutary result. Yet in any assessment of the deterrent function of 
tort law, the pluses are as difficult to measure as the minuses.195 One can 
point to specific examples of litigation that, at the very least, helped remove 
from the market or encourage the redesign of such unsafe products as the 
Dalkon Shield and tip-over hot water vaporizers.196 Tort suits have also un-
193. See Mintz, IUD Maker Gambles on the Informed Consumer, Wash. Post, Mar. 15, 1987, at 
H6, col. 1 (interview with Peter F. Carpenter, Executive Vice President of A1za Corporation). The 
process for ensuring that consumers are informed requires each patient to certify that she has read 
the entire leaflet provided by A1za and that the doctor has "answered all my questions and advised 
me of the risks and benefits associated with [the A1za IUD], with other forms of contraception, and 
with no forms of contraception." Id. The patient then declares: "I have considered all factors and 
voluntarily chosen to have [the A1za IUD] inserted by Dr.--." /d. 
194. See Sherman, Other IUD Makers Still Confident: Informed-Consent Programs Cited, Nat'l. 
L.J., Oct. 10, 1988, at 3, col. 1, at 26, col. 1. 
195. For example, Huber concedes that some violence may have been averted by the decision of 
the California Supreme Court in Tarasoffv. Regents of the Univ. of California, 17 Cal. 3d 425,431, 
551 P.2d 334, 340, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 20 (1976) (imposing a duty upon therapists to use reasonable 
care to protect potential victims from their patients whom they know or should know to be violent). 
P. HUBER, supra note 55, at 167. Yet without empirical evidence, he maintains that the costs of the 
rule, which may require interfering with the therapist-patient relationship and may deter therapists 
from treating violent patients, outweigh its benefits. Id. 
Huber's dismissal of the positive aspects of Tarasoff may be overly glib. In a recent article, a 
Washington, D.C., psychiatrist described how she was confronted with the predicament of treating 
a patient who had AIDS but continued to lead a hyperactive sex life of one-night and group en-
counters, despite his knowledge of AIDS' contagiousness and its dread consequences. The psychia-
trist concluded that her patient was purposefully handing out death sentences to his partners. In 
wrestling with her dilemma, the psychiatrist considered the rule of Tarasoff. Although it was not 
the determining factor in her decision to notify the appropriate authorities (indeed, as she realized, 
the courts of the District of Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia have not yet recognized Tarasoff's 
duty to warn), she stated that Tarasoff "helped me make up my mind." Van Susteren, Doctor's 
Horror.: Death on The Loose, Wash. Post, Feb. 26, 1989, at C1, col. 1. 
Unfo.rtunately, the psychiatrist's decision did not keep her patient from his deadly game because 
the hospital to which he was committed released him. But shortcomings in the law of involuntary 
commitment should not cloud the point that a tort decision pushed a psychiatrist toward a decision 
that may have saved numerous lives. 
196. See G. Schwartz, supra note 85, at 451 n.107 (quoting a newspaper article describing the 
redesign of the vaporizer found to be defectively designed in McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 
Minn. 322, 333, 154 N.W.2d 488, 497 (1967)). 
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covered corporate misconduct that might otherwise have gone undetected. 197 
Moreover, tort decisions have provoked legislative reaction that has pro-
moted public safety or health.t9s 
The business community provides some support for the argument that tort 
law has deterrent effects that encourage safe products. A survey by a man-
agement consulting firm that polled 101 high level corporate executives 
found that the principal effect of products liability lawsuits was to compel 
firms to be more attentive to the safety aspects of their products.199 A 1987 
report by the Conference Board, a business research group, found that: 
Where product liability has had a notable impact-where it has most sig-
nificantly affected management decision making-has been in the quality of 
the products themselves. Managers say products have become safer, man-
ufacturing procedures have been improved, and labels and use instructions 
have become more explicit.200 
In the debate over the deterrence function of tort law, much depends on 
197. The classic example is the asbestos litigation that exposed suppliers' efforts to conceal infor-
mation about the harmful effects of their product. See generally P. BRODEUR, supra note 102. 
198. An excellent example is the enactment of a handgun-control law in the State of Maryland. 
The Maryland Court of Appeals became the first high court in the country to rule that a victim 
injured by a handgun might have a cause of action against the manufacturer and marketer. See 
Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 304 Md. 124, 497 A.2d 1143 (1985). A legislative effort was made to 
overturn the decision. See Barnes, Md. Senate Votes to End Gun Liability: Bill Attacks Ruling on 
Cheap Weapons, Wash. Post, Mar. 17, 1987, at B1, col. 1. However, the state House of Delegates 
killed the measure. See Barnes, Advocates of Gun Control Score Bull's-Eye in Maryland Assembly, 
Wash. Post, Apr. 2, 1987, at D1, col. 2. A year later, however, the Maryland legislature approved 
a handgun-control law, effectively overruling Kelley. See Barnes, Bill Advocates Beat NRA at Its 
Own Game, Wash. Post, Apr. 12, 1988, at A1, col. 6. For an analysis of the political effects of tort 
decisions, see generally Zacharias, The Politics of Torts, 95 YALE L.J. 698 (1986). 
199. See The Litigious Society: Is It Hampering Creativity, Innovation, and Our Ability to Com-
pete?, 2 Corporate Issues Monitor (Egon Zehnder International), No. 3 (1987) [hereinafter 2 Corpo-
rate Issues Monitor No. 3]; see also Executives Say Lawsuits Have Forced Firms to Manufacture 
Safer Products, Daily Report for Executives (BNA), Jan. 7, 1988, at A3, col. 2; Study Says Safer 
Products Result from Fear of Suits, L.A. Times, Jan. 5, 1988, Home Ed. at 20, col. 4. Respondents 
to the survey also claimed that tort suits have stifled innovation and that lawyer avarice was the 
principal cause of the liability crisis. 2 Corporate Issues Monitor No. 3, supra, at 2. 
200. N. WEBER, PRODUCT LIABILITY: THE CORPORATE REsPONSE 2 (Conf. Board 1987). A 
later report by The Conference Board took a much more negative view of the impact of product 
liability and concluded that it has had a significantly detrimental effect upon the business commu-
nity. This effect includes cancellations of acquisitions, research, and products; creating an atmos-
phere of uncertainty; heavy demands on CEOs' time; high expense; and creating another obstacle to 
competitiveness. See E. MCGUIRE, THE IMPACT OF PRODUCT LIABILITY 17-20 {Conf. Board 
1988). The first report surveyed top managers of major companies and the second queried chief 
executive officers. Corporate contributors to The Conference Board were reportedly unhappy with 
the first report. See Walsh, Conference Board Hardens Stance on Liability Issue, Wash. Post, Apr. 
27, 1988, at F1, col. 3. 
A recent article published by The Conference Board and written by the author of the second 
report cites improvement in product safety design as one example of corporate progress in the 
product liability "game." See McGuire, Product Liability: Evolution and Reform, in PERSPECTIVES 
12 (The Conference Board, Inc.) No. 17 (May 1989) (other advances include resisting pressures to 
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the assignment of the burden of persuasion. A leading critic has averred that 
those who defend tort law on deterrence grounds lack convincing empirical 
evidence for their position.201 Yet in the political context of the controversy, 
it seems fair to suggest that those who, like Huber, wish to change the ex-
isting tort system, should carry the burden of proof. These reformers claim 
that tort law undermines more than it contributes to public safety and health. 
Liability fails to establish that the harm tort law causes by either removing 
useful products from the market or failing to discover beneficial products 
outweighs the benefits, which include removing unsafe products from the 
market, discouraging the introduction of dangerous products into the stream 
of commerce, and encouraging the ·manufacture of safe products. 202 
V. THE CONTRACT AS "KING" 
Huber contrasts his versi9n of a contemporary tort system dominated by 
the Founders' pernicious enterprise liability philosophy203 with a regime of 
contract law that he asserts at one time governed accident cases involving 
parties who had a preaccident relationship.204 If one party had promised to 
act with a certain level of skill or competence but performed below that level, 
the early English courts recognized a tort action in trespass for deceit. By 
the fifteenth century, however, they held that the new writ of assumpsit-
from which contract law evolved-would govern these kinds of cases. 205 The 
parties could make explicit deals with respect to the obligations they owed to 
one another and the legal system would uphold these arrangements. This 
meant that one party might disclaim any responsibilities relating to the trans-
action and if the other party assented, the agreement was binding. Accord-
ing to Huber, the law could imply certain obligations, such as the employer's 
duty to provide reasonably safe tools, on the basis of common consent. "But 
the general rule was that contract was king,"206 and tort law was "a backwa-
settle claims quickly, more closely documenting premarket product tests, upgrading the quality of 
counsel, and improving the quantity and quality of product warnings and disclaimers). 
201. See Sugarman, supra note 54, at 587. 
202. At least one commentator has argued that tort law falls short of fulfilling its deterrence 
mission because for certain classes of plaintiffs, it underestimates the true costs of accidents; it also 
creates an inadequate threat ofliability to defendants calculating their accident-prevention expendi-
tures by measuring their potential liability exposure. See Pierce, supra note 54, at 1290-95 (measure 
of damages for wrongful deaths of children undervalues worth that society places upon children's 
lives). This argument, of course, could be used in support of reforming damages law in a way that 
would increase jury verdicts in certain categories of cases. 
203. See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text. 
204. See P. HUBER, supra note 55, at 20-21. 
205. /d. at 21-22; see also T. PLUCKNETI, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 405-06 
(1929) (actions of assumpsit lay for "malfeasance" as early as 1348). 
206. P. HUBER, supra note 55, at 23. To illustrate how this worked in the product liability 
context, Huber describes the 1937 elixir-of-sulfanilamide disaster, in which an untested drug caused 
widespread consumer fatalities. /d. at 24; see also C. JACKSON, FOOD AND DRUG LEGISLATION IN 
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ter of the legal system"20'-a state of affairs that, by Huber's account, did 
not change until the 1960s and 1970s when the courts undertook "to rewrite 
the common law of accidents from beginning to end."208 
The problem with this interpretation of legal history is that it states as the 
exception what is the rule. Judicial imposition of a duty of due care began 
earlier and became far more widespread than Huber allows. Long before the 
great revolution, courts routinely imposed tort liability for the negligent per-
formance of contracts.209 The "common consent" Huber mentions210 might 
have formed the basis for an action for breach of an implied promise, but the 
basis for the tort action was a breach of duty imposed by the common law.211 
One might expect that Huber would lament the development of negligence 
law as the remedy of choice for physical harm or property damage claims 
arising from substandard performance by a party to a contractual relation-
ship.212 However, he vaults neatly over this phase oflegal history and alights 
upon the recognition of the implied warranty of fitness for human consump-
tion arising from the sale of food and drugs in the early part of the twentieth 
century, a step he views as the beginning of the end for "the primacy of 
contracts."213 He claims that the courts took this step to complement con-
gressional passage of the federal "Pure Food Act in 1905"214 because they 
found a "shared understanding between buyer and seller . . . that food or 
THE NEW DEAL 151-74 (1970) (107 people died from poisonous ingredient in elixir; tragedy fueled 
support for stronger federal food and drug legislation). Huber points out that under contract prin-
ciples, which "in this rugged world could operate very harshly ...• [i]fusers of the drug had wanted 
a guarantee of its safety and effectiveness, they should have demanded one before buying ...• [A] 
deal was a deal, even when it worked out appallingly for one side or the other." P. HUBER, supra 
note 55, at 24. He does not appear to register any discomfort with such harsh results. 
207. P. HUBER, supra note 55, at 4. 
208. Id. at 28. 
209. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 12, § 92, at 660-61 (documenting cases impos-
ing tort liability for contract misperformance as early as 1851). The authors explain: 
I d. 
[T]he American courts have extended the tort liability for misfeasance to virtually every 
type of contract where a defective performance may injure the promisee .•.. The principle 
which seems to have emerged from the decisions in the United States is that there will be 
liability in tort for misperformance of a contract whenever there would be liability for 
gratuitous performance without the contract-which is to say, whenever such mis-
performance involves a foreseeable, unreasonable risk of harm to the interests of the 
plaintiff. 
210. See P. HUBER, supra note 55, at 23. 
211. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 12, § 92, at 656-57. 
212. On the advantages of tort actions, see id. at 665-66 (in addition to permitting recovery of 
greater damages, tort actions, unlike contract actions, permit recovery for wrongful death; they may 
be available when the contract fails; and tort claims may avoid some defenses, some counterclaims, 
and some instances in which joining several defendants might otherwise be necessary). 
213. P. HUBER, supra note 55, at 25. 
214. Id. The Act was passed in 1906, not 1905. Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (1906) (re-
pealed 1938 and replaced with Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301·393 
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drugs sold for human use were fit for that purpose."215 
Huber's treatment is a somewhat dubious reading of the history of war-
ranty actions involving products for human consumption. Long before the 
tum of the century, an implied warranty applied to retailers of food and 
rested upon public safety concerns apart from any mutual understanding be-
tween sellers and buyers.216 The interesting development in the early de-
cades of the twentieth century was the judicial recognition of a cause of 
action in tort. The injured food consumers could sue manufacturers or sup-
pliers with whom they were not in privity of contract for breach of an im-
plied warranty that the food in question be reasonably fit for human 
consumption.217 This extension of liability was not contractually based, but 
rested upon considerations of consumer protection.218 
Huber goes on to claim that when the Founders took hold of this "new" 
judicial theory of implied warranty, they used it to overthrow "traditional 
contract theory." The first giant step was taken in Henningsen v. Bloomfield 
Motors, Inc. ,219 in which the New Jersey Supreme Court permitted the wife 
of the purchaser of a new automobile to recover for breach of an implied 
warranty of merchantability against both the retailer and the manufac-
turer.220 The court allowed her to sue despite a lack of privity of contract 
between herself and the manufacturer and despite language in the sales con-
tract that specifically precluded such recovery.2z1 
Huber's treatment of Henningsen is characteristically fast and loose: he 
makes the astonishing claim that the court invented the implied warranty of 
merchantability that it applied;222 he dubiously asserts that the plaintiff could 
(1988))). It was called the Food and Drugs Act. See U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, FOOD AND 
DRUGS Acr (C. Gwinn ed. 1914). 
215. P. HUBER, supra note 54, at 25. 
216. See R. DICKERSON, PRODUCI'S LIABILITY AND THE FOOD CoNSUMER 19-31, 36-37 (1951) 
(special food warranty probably had roots in medieval English common law, beginning in 1266 with 
criminal penalties for trafficking in "corrupt" food and drink; American courts historically appear 
to assess liability in light of public policy, rather than tortious representation, broken promises, or 
local food laws). 
217. See id. at 99-103 ("privity gap" bridged in Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 P. 
633 (1913), and .in Kennedy v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 205 A.D. 648, 200 N.Y.S. 121 (App. Div. 
1923), through actions in tort for breach of warranty.) 
218. See Mazetti, 75 Wash. at 630, 135 P. at 636 (food manufacturers impliedly warrant their 
packaged product to be fit for consumption to consumers as well as to distributors and retailers). 
Mazetti is discussed in Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection: Doctrine, Func-
tion and Legal Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REv. 1109, 1135-37 (1974). 
219. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). 
220. Id. at 413, 161 A.2d at 99. 
221. Id. at 404, 161 A.2d at 95. 
222. He states that "the New Jersey Supreme Court in that case discovered an implied warranty 
under which Bloomfield had promised [plaintiff's] husband ... (without ever actually saying so), a 
certain degree of safety in the car." P. HUBER, supra note 55, at 73. In fact, the New Jersey 
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not show that any vehicle parts were defective;223 he fails to mention that the 
plaintiff in the case suffered personal injuries;224 and he states that the sales 
contract "promised only to replace any defective parts."225 What he does 
not add is that although the contract warranted the vehicle free from defec-
tive parts, it limited the manufacturer's obligation to replace only those de-
fective parts that the purchaser returned to the factory and that the 
manufacturer determined to its satisfaction to be defective.226 In addition, 
the contract disclaimed all other express or implied warranties.227 
The Henningsen court decided that this broad disclaimer was void because 
the manufacturer's warranty was inimical to the public good and in conflict 
with legislative and judicial policies of New Jersey relating to the compensa-
tion of personal injuries.228 It found that the warranty cum disclaimer was a 
standard form contract used by almost all domestic automobile manufactur-
ers and a classic contract of adhesion to which the plaintiff had no meaning-
ful alternative. 229 
Huber finds this judicial overreaching. Yet under the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, drafted by those whose views were very different from those of the 
Founders and enacted in every jurisdiction except Louisiana, a court con-
fronted by facts identical to those in Henningsen would reach the same 
result.230 
Supreme Court was applying an implied warranty of merchantability that existed by virtue of the 
New Jersey Uniform Sales Act. Henningsen, 32 N.J. at 371-72, 161 A.2d at 76-77. 
223. P. HUBER, supra note 55, at 28. The undisputed testimony of the insurance company's 
inspector and appraiser, who examined the car after the accident, was "that something definitely 
went 'wrong from the steering wheel down to the front wheels .•. something down there had to 
drop off or break loose' ... . "Henningsen, 32 N.J. at 369, 161 A.2d at 75. 
224. On the significance of the fact that plaintiff suffered personal injuries, see infra note 228 and 
accompanying text. 
225. P. HUBER, supra note 55, at 28. 
226. Henningsen, 32 N.J. at 367, 161 A.2d at 74. 
227. Id. 
228. Id. at 403-04, 161 A.2d at 94-95. 
229. Id. at 393, 403-04, 161 A.2d at 88, 94-95. 
230. Under U.C.C. § 2-316(a) (1987), to exclude an implied warranty of merchantability, the 
contract "language must mention merchantability and •.. must be conspicuous." The warranty 
disclaimer in Henningsen did not mention merchantability and included the seventh of the ten 
"conditions" on the back of the purchase order, in the midst of eight and one-half inches of fine 
print. 
In addition, under U.C.C. § 2-719{2) {1987), if the remedy agreed upon by the contracting parties 
fails in its essential purpose, the remedies provided under the Code will apply. These include full 
recovery for injury to the person. Id. § 2-715(2)(b). 
Moreover, under U.C.C. § 2-719(3), "[l]imitation of consequential damages for injury to the per· 
son in case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable ...• " 
Today the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act would es-
tablish another basis for reaching the same result in Henningsen. The Act provides that: "No 
supplier may disclaim . . . any implied warranty to a consumer with respect to such consumer 
product if ... such supplier makes any written warranty .... " Pub. L. No. 93-637, tit. I,§ 108{a), 
1990] LIABILITY 693 
After Henningsen, Huber claims that the Founders and their followers 
were able to convince courts231 to void not only disclaimers or limitations of 
liability in sales contracts, but also what might better be characterized as 
express assumptions of the risk of tort liability. 232 He could have added that 
under the new doctrine of strict tort liability for harm caused by defective, 
unreasonably dangerous products, implied assumption of risk would be a de-
fense only if the plaintiff's conduct had been unreasonable.233 
Huber's unhappiness with the courts' sweeping rejections of disclaimers 
and express assumptions of risk stems from the fact that he deplores the 
demise of contract as a factor in lawsuits seeking recovery for personal injury 
or death. Indeed, his solution for the torts crisis is to reinvigorate contract 
law as a basis for resolving personal injury and property damage disputes, 
but with "a more human face."234 Following trails blazed by Professors 
Richard A. Epstein235 and Jeffrey O'Connell,236 he advocates using pre-acci-
dent arrangements between parties as the primary mechanism for allocating 
losses. Individuals can bargain for and mutually agree upon the kind of com-
pensation coverage best suited to them. The law would then uphold the 
commitments that they reached. This new order would be stable, predict-
88 Stat. 2189 (1975) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2308(a) (1982)). The purpose of this provision was "to 
eliminate the practice of giving an express warranty while at the sante time disclaiming implied 
warranties. This practice often has the effect of limiting the rights of the consumer rather than 
expanding them as he might otherwise be led to believe." H.R. REP. No. 1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 
40 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CoNG. & ADM1N. NEWS 7702, 7722. Thus, the Act seeks 
to prevent a seller from doing exactly what the defendant tried to do in Henningsen-give a war-
ranty that all parts are free from defects and then take away the consumer's other state-created 
rights that would make that warranty meaningful. 
231. Huber asserts that by this time, the Founders had "captured" the courts. P. HUBER, supra 
note 55, at 29. 
232. One example is the disclaimer sometimes found on a ski-lift ticket. See id. at 31. An injured 
skier might bring an action in tort for negligence against the operator of a ski area. A defense could 
be express assumption of risk, as evidenced by language limiting liability and printed on the ticket. 
On express assumption of risk, see generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 12, § 68, at 
482-84. 
233. See REsTATEMENT, supra note 83, § 402A comment n. 
234. P. HUBER, supra note 55, at 226. 
235. See generally Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case for Contract, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. 
REs. J. 87 (1976) (arguing that private agreements between doctors and patients provide the best 
way of resolving liability for injuries resulting from medical treatment). 
236. Professor O'Connell was a pioneer in the development of automobile no-fault liability. See 
R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, supra note 46. He has since become a leading advocate for elective 
no-fault liability through contracts offered by providers of goods and services. See, e.g., O'Connell, 
supra note 54 (proposing that current tort system be replaced with method for compensating acci-
dent victims through pre-accident no-fault agreements); O'Connell, Elective No-Fault Liability by 
Contract With or Without an Enabling Statute, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 59 (proposing that existing tort 
system be replaced with business/customer contracts incorporating no-fault liability for personal 
injury); O'Connell, No-Fault Liability by Contract for Doctors, Manufacturers, Retailers and Others, 
1975 INS. L.J. 531 (encouraging voluntary corporate experimentation with elective no-fault insur-
ance systems). 
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able, and much less costly to operate than the current tort system. It would 
also encourage greater use of health and disability insurance, which could be 
extended to injuries and illnesses that currently are not covered at all. Tort 
law would be confined within narrow boundaries.237 Public risk regulation, 
as a supplement to bargained-for levels of safety, would be left to legislatures 
and administrative agencies staffed by experts.23S 
State courts could reach this state of affairs by rejecting strict liability in 
tort for defective, unreasonably dangerous products. They would have to cut 
back on negligence by requiring defendants to conform only to contractual 
norms, customary standards of conduct (unless altered or nullified by agree-
ment of the parties), or applicable standards set by regulatory agencies. And 
they would have to reinvigorate the defenses of contributory fault and as-
sumption of risk. Finally, the courts would be forced to give effect to con-
tractual arrangements, including disclaimers, entered into by parties to a 
wide range of relationships. 239 Presumably, the market would then provide 
levels of economic protection that suited the joint interests of the parties. 
For example, if a consumer wanted compensation for all or certain specified 
injuries caused by a product, she could bargain for the appropriate insurance 
coverage, which would then be included in the product's price. Patients 
could bargain with their physicians for compensation from adverse effects of 
medical treatment. One advantage of this system would be that individuals 
seeking compensation through contract could obtain the amount they desire 
and pay for it accordingly. This would be an improvement over the current 
tort system, which requires all purchasers of products to pay the same 
price-a price that includes the cost of insuring for liability payments that 
will vary according to the economic worth of the plaintiff. 240 
The system proposed by Huber would carry with it staggering transaction 
costs. The burden of acquiring information would fall heavily upon individ-
ual consumers of goods and services. The time spent bargaining for and 
agreeing upon liability-triggering conditions and levels of compensation 
237. "Tort law in some measure will always be needed, so that we may not be used in certain 
ways by others merely as means or tools or material resources. But a boundary to tort liability is 
needed .... " P. HuBER, supra note 55, at 231. 
238. This is a major point put forward in Huber, supra note 60. See also Henderson, supra note 
168, at 1555, 1574-76 (safety trade-off problems are so complicated that courts should not second· 
guess agencies). 
239. For similar recommendations put forward by a research and education organization com-
prised of business executives, see CoMMITIEE FOR EcONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, WHO SHOULD BE 
LIABLE? A GUIDE TO POLICY FOR DEALING WITH RISK (1989). 
On the desirability of judicial rather than legislative tort reform, see Barrett, supra note 68, at B1, 
col. 4. 
240. For criticism of this aspect of the tort system, see Priest, supra note 35, at 1557-59 (third· 
party liability insurance works disadvantage to poor consumers, who must pay as much for prod-
ucts as wealthy consumers although the latter will recover higher damage awards). 
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would be substantial. Insurers would find it difficult to calculate premiums 
because they could not know in advance the terms of the various particular~ 
ized deals negotiated by their insureds. This would inevitably lead to the use 
of standard form contracts by parties with superior bargaining power, and to 
the sorts of abuses that led to intervention by courts and legislatures in the 
past.241 
The gains the new system would achieve would be slight. Consider the 
production and sale of small airplanes, one of the problem areas that Huber 
discusses.242 Even if some plaintiffs could willingly and knowledgeably bar~ 
gain for less safety in return for a cheaper product, and if they should be 
allowed to do so, the doctrine of express assumption of risk limiting the lia~ 
bility of manufacturers would affect only these purchasers. The pre~accident 
agreements to assume certain risks would bar recovery only by the plane's 
owner and would not bind third parties who might pilot the plane, fly as 
guests, or suffer ground damage from crashes. Thus, the degree of relief that 
assumption of risk would .afford manufacturers would be relatively slight, 
given the small numbers of consumers who might be affected and the ~odest 
size of the risk that would be limited. 243 
Huber's exclusive reliance upon administrative agencies for public regula~ 
tion of risk244 presupposes that the executive branch will adopt the necessary 
policies to ensure levels of regulation that will adequately protect consumers 
and the general public; that able and committed individuals will be appointed 
to the relevant agencies; and that lawmakers will appropriate funds sufficient 
to enable the agencies to carry out their increased responsibilities. The ef~ 
forts made by the Reagan Administration to restrict the tort system245 while 
attempting to weaken the federal regulatory system246 suggest that this as~ 
241. See generally Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract, 
43 CoLUM. L. REv. 629 (1943) (development of modern free enterprise system required freedom of 
contract, which has ironically led to widespread use of efficient but inequitable adhesion contracts). 
242. SeeP. HUBER, supra note 55, at 45-46, 140, 161. Huber notes the small airplane industry 
paid $210 million in liability claims in 1985 alone, requiring new model planes to carry a 50% 
surcharge for liability insurance. Id. at 161. Nevertheless, Huber's choice of this example is curi-
ous, inasmuch as it involves a particularly atypical category of consumers-people wealthy enough 
to buy airplanes and qualified to fly them. 
243. On the growing use of waivers to limit liability for sports injuries and the tendency of courts 
to uphold them, see Barrett, Liability Waivers Hold Up in More Sports-Injury Suits, Wall St. J., 
Nov. 11, 1988, at B1, col. 3. 
244. The legislative branch certainly has the power to regulate public risks directly. One exam-
ple is the Refrigerator Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1211 (1982), requiring that household refrigerators 
be equipped with a device enabling the door to be opened from the inside. 
245. For the recommendations of a federal interagency task force calling for modifications that 
would make it more difficult for plaintiffs to recover damages in tort cases, see TORT POLICY 
WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 3, at 6. 
246. On the impact of the deregulation policy upon the Consumer Product Safety Commission, 
see Tobias, Consumer Agency Falling Down on Job, Legal Times, Mar. 20, 1989, at 19, col. 1; see 
also RETREAT FROM SAFETY: REAGAN'S ATTACK ON AMERICA'S HEALTH 41-70 (J. Claybrook ed. 
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sumption may not be valid.247 
Finally, the practical difficulties that confront Huber's formula for radical 
change are formidable. To envision that every state court will fall into line 
requires a great deal of imagination. The new order could result from legisla-
tive action, either state or federal, but political opposition would reach mas-
sive proportions. Such opposition would invite the sort of compromises that 
form an inherent part of the legislative process and could undercut the 
"counterrevolution" Huber advocates.248 Moreover, the current content of 
federal safety standards may well reflect an understanding by regulators that 
the rules they promulgated are not meant to be the exclusive mechanisms for 
public risk regulation.249 Therefore, the Huber counterrevolution would 
have to include a grace period during which agencies would review, update, 
and if necessary, extend their regulations in light of the enhanced role they 
would be required to play under the new regime. Creating such a grace pe-
riod and determining how long it should run would seem to require the type 
of legislative decision that courts have traditionally been loathe to make, thus 
impeding judicial implementation of the counterrevolution. 
VI. CoNCLUSION 
What Huber proposes is a giant leap backward.250 He would roll back a 
significant number of pro-plaintiff common law doctrines adopted not only 
during the great revolution but also earlier in the century. He does not ex-
plain why he thinks potential defendants and their insurers will behave any 
1984) (identifying adverse consumer health and safety consequences of deregulation as effected by 
Food and Drug Administration and Consumer Product Safety Commission). 
247. As one writer has observed, commenting upon a similar tort reform proposal: "[T]o sup-
plant the social conscience of a jury with socialized medicine and stronger regulatory standards[ ] 
require[s] a faith in the incorruptibility of government that should make even Pollyanna blush ..•• " 
Van Strum, How the Agent Orange Case Poisoned the Courts (Book Review), USA Today, Jan. 30, 
1987, at 6D, col. 2 (reviewing P. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MAss TOXIC DISASTERS IN 
THE CoURTS (1986)). 
On the nexus between tort law and regulatory standards, see T. Schwartz, The Role of Federal 
Safety Regulations in Products Liability Actions, 41 V AND. L. REv. 1121 (1988). 
248. For the difficulties inherent in legislative tort reform, see supra notes 36-37 and accompany-
ing text; see also Pierce, Institutional Aspects of Tort Reform, 13 CALIF. L. REv. 917, 919-22 (1985) 
(unwillingness oflegislatures to implement comprehensive statutory changes makes them ineffective 
as instruments of tort reform). 
249. Indeed, the statutes authorizing such regulations may specifically state this. See National 
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1397(c) (1982) ("Compliance with any Federal 
motor vehicle safety standard issued under this subchapter does not exempt any person from any 
liability under common law .... "); Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2074(a) {1982) 
("Compliance ... shall not relieve any person from liability at common law or under State statutory 
law to any other person .... "). 
250. Professor Richard A. Epstein freely admits that his proposal to use contract as a means of 
addressing the problem of medical injuries is a "determined step backwards." Epstein, supra note 
235, at 149. 
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differently than they did when tort law was a "backwater" and contract was 
"king." He fails to explain why the political and economic realities that pre-
viously left workers, consumers, and others at the mercy of those with whom 
they did business will somehow produce more just and humane relationships 
under the sort of libertarian regime he espouses, rather than replicate the 
conditions that initially gave rise to the old tort reform. In effect, his radical 
reform is an invitation for history to repeat itself. 
Those who argue that the tort system cries out for drastic overhaul bear 
the responsibility to show that what they propose to set up in its place will 
not only work but will work better. Liability, with its "slash-and-bum" ap-
proach and cavalier regard for accuracy, vastly overstates the case against 
tort law. Huber offers yesterday as a blueprint for tomorrow, without regard 
for the fact that it was yesterday that produced today. 
